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CLASS CONFLICTS 
Morris A. Ratner
*
 
Abstract: The approach of the twentieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor provides the opportunity to reflect on the 
collapse of the framework it announced for managing intra-class conflicts. That framework, 
reinforced two years later in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., was bold, in that it broadly defined 
actionable conflicts to include divergent interests with regard to settlement allocation; 
market-based, in that it sought to regulate such conflicts by harnessing competing subclass 
counsel’s financial incentives; and committed to intrinsic process values, insofar as, to assure 
structural fairness, the Court was willing to upend a settlement that would have solved the 
asbestos litigation crisis. Since the 1990s, the lower federal courts have chipped away at the 
foundation of that conflicts management regime by limiting Amchem and Ortiz to their facts, 
narrowly defining the kinds of conflicts that warrant subclassing, and turning to alternative 
assurances of fairness that do not involve fostering competition among subclass counsel. A 
new model of managing class conflicts is emerging from the trenches of federal trial courts. 
It is modest, insofar as it has a high tolerance for allocation conflicts; regulatory, rather than 
market or incentive-based, in that it relies on judicial officers to police conflicts; and 
utilitarian, because settlement outcomes provide convincing evidence of structurally fair 
procedures. In short, the new model is fundamentally the mirror image of the conflicts 
management framework the Court created at end of the last century. This Article provides an 
institutional account of this transformation, examining how changes in the way mass tort and 
other large-scale wrongs are litigated make it inconvenient to adhere to the Supreme Court’s 
twentieth century conflicts management blueprint. There is a lesson here: a jurisprudential 
edifice built without regard to the practical realities of resolving large-scale litigation cannot 
stand.  
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INTRODUCTION 
At the close of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court overturned 
two of the largest mass tort
1
 settlements in U.S. history on the ground 
that intra-class conflicts of interest rendered representation inadequate. 
The trial courts in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
2
 and Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp.
3
 had approved class action settlements of asbestos 
claims where in each case the members of the settlement class had 
divergent interests with regard to settlement design and specifically with 
regard to allocation of settlement amounts among class members. 
The Court held that such conflicts could not be overcome merely by 
showing that a settlement was good, or, in the uninspiring language of 
Rule 23, “adequate.”4 Instead, adequate representation had to be baked 
into the organization of plaintiffs and class counsel to justify non-party 
preclusion of absent class members.
5
 In Amchem and Ortiz, that meant 
that the settlement classes had to be divided into subclasses, each with 
their own representative plaintiffs and, importantly, their own lawyers 
whose attorneys’ fees depended on the subclass members’ fortunes and 
who could thus be trusted to loyally advance their interests when 
                                                     
1. As used herein, the term “mass tort” refers broadly to mass production injuries. See MANUAL 
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.1 at 343 (2004) [hereinafter MANUAL] (mass tort 
litigation “emerges when an event or series of related events injure a large number of people or 
damage their property” (internal quotation omitted)); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: 
What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. LEGIS. 393, 393 n.1 (2000) (defining mass 
torts “as encompassing any (negligently or strictly) tortious systematic risk-taking by business that 
exposes some population of individuals to injury in person or property or both”). Because they often 
involve claims of varying strength, including differences in type of injury, proof of causation, and 
applicable law, mass tort class actions raise particularly vexing conflicts of interest problems. See 
generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF 
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 5354 (1995). 
2. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
3. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
5. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 591; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 815.  
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negotiating settlement terms.
6
 Failure to do so rendered class 
certification illegitimate and justified overturning the class settlements in 
those cases, leaving the federal trial courts saddled with the asbestos 
litigation crisis without any viable tools for resolving it outside of 
bankruptcy proceedings.
7
 
Though the Supreme Court has not squarely returned to the conflicts 
management questions it answered in Amchem and Ortiz, the lower 
federal courts have spent the better part of the past two decades chipping 
away at their foundations, limiting them to their facts, assuming away 
and narrowly defining the kinds of conflicts of interest that warrant 
subclassing, and turning to alternative structural assurances of fairness 
that do not involve fostering competition among class counsel.
8
 In their 
place, lower federal courts have erected a mirror image of the Amchem 
conflicts management regime, one that is modest in ambition, prefers 
regulatory to market approaches to managing conflicts, and privileges 
utilitarianism over the intrinsic value of procedural fairness.
9
 
From the beginning, Amchem and Ortiz generated critical academic 
commentary.
10
 Courts have largely sought to distinguish or reinterpret 
                                                     
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) states that “[w]hen appropriate, a class may be divided into subclasses 
that are each treated as a class under this rule.” See generally ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.23 at 337 (2016) [hereinafter ANNOTATED MANUAL] (“Subclasses must 
be created when differences in the positions of class members require separate representatives and 
separate counsel.”); 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:58 at 346–47 
(5th ed. 2011) (“Conflicts of interest between the class representative and some members of the 
class often may be resolved through the creation of subclasses.”); Scott Dodson, Subclassing, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2351 (2006) (reviewing subclasses and theories of their proper role).  
7. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and 
Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, 1906–10 (2002) (describing asbestos litigation filings post-Amchem 
and Ortiz); Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After 
Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1931 (2002) (noting that for many defendants 
bankruptcy became the only logical response after Amchem and Ortiz). 
8. See infra section II.C. 
9. For a typology of market, regulatory, and other approaches to managing class actions, see 
generally William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 
53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1453–67 (2006). For purposes of this Article, the terms “procedural 
fairness” and “structural fairness” are used interchangeably, though the former is arguably broader 
than the latter. 
10. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. 
REV. 337, 351 (1999) (criticizing the “retreat to rules formalism” in Amchem and Ortiz); Richard A. 
Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287, 330 (2003) 
(“Interest alignment within the class certainly should remain a part of due process analysis. But it is 
only a part, and not the most important one at that . . . . [T]he law might better ground the 
legitimacy of class representation in the structural constraints that operate upon representatives in 
governing arrangements where consent is already attenuated—the administrative state being the 
prime example.”); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel 
in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1469 (1998) (“We first criticize the 
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them rather than undertake a direct attack.
11
 We are thus left to read 
between the lines of the lower courts’ decisions both to notice and to do 
a forensic analysis of Amchem’s death by a thousand cuts. This Article 
takes up that challenge, providing an institutional account by looking at 
the ways in which a profound transformation over the past two decades 
in the arrangements for managing mass torts via the multi-district 
litigation model (“MDL model”)12 has boosted federal courts’ 
confidence in their ability to directly regulate conflicts, while making 
subclassing with separate counsel especially inconvenient. In so doing, 
the Article ties together three strands in the class action and mass tort 
literature: commentary prematurely
13
 proclaiming the death of class 
actions and the emergence of the new MDL model for managing mass 
tort and other complex litigation;
14
 a rich and burgeoning literature 
                                                     
unreality of the Amchem Court’s ‘no trade-offs’ approach that would apparently preclude counsel 
from making any settlement allocation decisions, or handling other conflicts, in the class action 
context.”). 
11. See infra section II.C.  
12. This new model is described more fully in Part III infra. See generally Edward F. Sherman, 
The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class Action is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 2205 (2008); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method for 
Managing Multi-District Litigation: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 105, 110 (2010) 
(“The four practices just described–judicial appointment of lead attorneys, judicial control of lead 
attorneys’ compensation, forced fee transfer, and fee cuts–jointly constitute the emerging ‘quasi 
class action’ approach to MDL management.”); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From 
Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation after Ortiz, 58 KAN. 
L. REV. 775 (2010). 
13. See Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American 
Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 404 (2014) (“[N]otwithstanding the advent of nonclass aggregate 
litigation, Rule 23 class litigation remains a vital feature of the litigation landscape.”). But see 
Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A Prognosis, 65 EMORY L.J. 1569, 1600 (2016) 
(“A few courts have been willing to certify personal injury class actions for settlement purposes. 
Examples include the National Football League concussion litigation and the Deepwater Horizon 
case. For the most part, however, personal injury mass torts continue to be adjudicated outside of 
the class action arena. I believe that this trend will continue in the next decade.”). 
14. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal 
Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 88 (2011) (“The mass-tort class action as we know it is virtually 
extinct.”); Eric D. Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We’ll Settle in Bunches: 
Bringing Rule 23 into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1773, 1778 (1997) (“[I]t is 
apparent that few, if any, mass tort classes (especially those involving exposure-only victims), could 
meet the majority’s interpretation of Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance test or Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy 
of representation test. . . .”); Noah Smith-Drelich, Curing the Mass Tort Settlement Malaise, 48 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 6 (2014) (“[C]lass actions are no longer viable in the mass tort context . . . .”). 
See also Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO. L.J. 295, 
309 (1996) (“In short, although the prospect of Supreme Court review does raise some hope for 
clarification, recent decisions cast doubt upon the suggestion that Rule 23, in its current form, will 
enable the legal system either to afford justice in a timely manner between plaintiffs and defendants 
or to ease the burden upon the courts of doing so.”). 
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regarding “new” mass tort conflicts that arise in the MDL setting;15 and 
the traditional class action conflicts literature.
16
 The link among these 
literatures is the vital but underappreciated role that class actions still 
play in the new MDL model as a form of legal closure.
17
 
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly describes 
the regime for identifying and managing class conflicts that the Supreme 
Court erected in Amchem and Ortiz. Part II uses recent class settlements 
of sprawling mass torts in the BP oil spill and NFL concussion injury 
litigations to show how far we have strayed from Amchem and maps the 
attack vectors lower courts have pursued toward that end. Part III 
describes the new institutional arrangements for managing mass torts 
that explain Amchem’s decline and the emergence of a competing and 
newly ascendant conflicts management model.
18
 The purpose of this 
                                                     
15. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
71 (2015) (reviewing conflicts that result from the interplay of repeat players and systemic 
pressures); L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass 
Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157 (2004) (describing collusion in non-
class aggregate settlements); Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus 
Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 279 (2011) (reviewing ethical challenges posed by the non-class 
settlement of Vioxx litigation); Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and 
Ethical Implications of Coordinating Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381 (2000) 
(reviewing ethical challenges created by informal aggregation); Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in 
Mass Tort Plaintiffs’ Representation: Beyond the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3233 (2013) (discussing ethical issues in non-class aggregate litigation). 
16. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1373–84 (1995) (surveying forms of collusion in class actions); Susan P. 
Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 129, 145–55 (2001) (surveying forms of class action abuse); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 
1159, 1179–1212 (1995) (sketching ethics of mass tort settlement with emphasis on class 
settlements); Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the 
Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 581, 583–97 (2003) (inquiring into the proper 
standard for dealing with class conflicts); Nancy J. Moore, “Who Should Regulate Class Action 
Lawyers?”, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1477, 1482–1503 (2003) (surveying ethics issues in class actions, 
focusing on conflicts; proposing adoption of an entity theory of the class and use of Rule 23 case 
law to evolve regulatory mechanisms mindful of the ethics rules). 
17. Legal “closure” or “peace” results from a class judgment because the judgment precludes 
continued litigation of claims governed by the class settlement’s release as to all persons who do not 
opt out of the settlement class. See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class 
Settlements: The Godfather Guide to Opt-Out Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141 (2003) (describing 
how designers of class settlements attempt to achieve closure).  
18. In adopting an institutional evolutionary vantage point, the Article follows a trail blazed in the 
mass tort setting by, among others, Professor Schuck, who used the same lens to explain 
developments in an earlier (pre-Amchem) era. Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional 
Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 944 (1995) (“The evolutionist emphasis draws 
attention to, and treats in a more consistent fashion, three distinct but related features of mass torts 
litigation: (1) incremental systems-building, (2) common-law process, and (3) selection by judges 
and other policymakers among competing institutional designs.”); see also Donald Elliott, 
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Article is not to judge this new regime, but to announce and explain its 
arrival. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S LATE-TWENTIETH CENTURY 
BLUEPRINT FOR MANAGING CLASS CONFLICTS 
A. The Ill-Defined Pre-Amchem Regime 
In the 1940 decision Hansberry v. Lee,
19
 the Supreme Court noted the 
“principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that 
one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is 
not designated as a party.”20 The Court recognized an exception, i.e., 
“the judgment in a ‘class’ or ‘representative’ suit, to which some 
members of the class are parties, may bind members of the class or those 
represented who were not made parties to it.”21 But, the Court held, the 
Due Process Clause requires adequate representation as a condition of 
such non-party preclusion.
22
 In Hansberry, the Illinois state courts had 
found a prior state trial court judgment binding not only on the named 
plaintiff who had successfully enforced a racially restrictive property 
covenant, but also on a class of property owners, some of whom wished 
to enforce the covenant and others of whom opposed it.
23
 In other words, 
the class included persons with diametrically opposed interests who 
were potentially directly adverse, as evidenced by the fact that the class 
judgment was being used and challenged collaterally in a subsequent suit 
brought by class members who supported the covenant against those 
who did not.
24
 Under those circumstances, the Court held, representation 
was inadequate. 
When the modern version of Rule 23 of the federal rules took shape 
in 1966, it included a requirement of adequate representation applicable 
                                                     
Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 30607 (1986) 
(laying out an evolutionary theory of procedure, tracing it to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and his 
precursors).  
19. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
20. Id. at 40. 
21. Id. at 41. 
22. Id. at 42–43 (“It is familiar doctrine of the federal courts that members of a class not present 
as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately 
represented.”).  
23. Id. at 44 (“Because of the dual and potentially conflicting interests of those who are putative 
parties to the agreement in compelling or resisting its performance, it is impossible to say, solely 
because they are parties to it, that any two of them are of the same class.”). 
24. Id. at 4445. 
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to all class actions, but did not identify which conflicts less complete or 
direct than those at issue in Hansberry were disabling.
25
 In the ensuing 
years, the Court has never fully mapped such lesser conflicts.
26
 
Nevertheless, ethics doctrine provides a helpful analytical framework.
27
 
Conflicts are inevitable if clients are directly adverse, but can also arise 
when the duties a lawyer owes to one person present a significant risk of 
material limitation of the lawyer’s representation of another.28 In formal 
aggregation, we are especially concerned with a subset of the universe of 
potential material limitation conflicts, i.e., those that are structural in that 
they threaten to “skew systematically the conduct of the litigation so as 
to favor some claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned 
evaluation of their respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally 
vis-à-vis the lawyers themselves.”29 
Intra-class material limitation conflicts that have the possibility of 
skewing outcomes are generally of two types—investment and 
allocation.
30
 Investment conflicts typically arise when subgroups of class 
                                                     
25. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
26. This is largely the result of the way in which disputes bubble up to the Supreme Court. The 
Court is called upon in each instance to determine whether the facts of a specific case render class 
counsel impermissibly conflicted, but does not act legislatively to address all possible categories of 
conflicts unrelated to the facts at hand. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
625 (1997) (assessing adequacy of representation by reference to the class approved in that case); 
see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Supreme Court as Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 
(1978) (“I do not wish to be misunderstood as saying that the Court should make legal 
pronouncements in broader categorical terms rather than narrower ones. I only say that the 
appropriate breadth of its pronouncements about law is determined neither by considerations of 
‘rationality’ nor by the ‘nature’ of the judicial process.”). 
27. Ethics law does not supply the rule of decision for purposes of determining whether 
subclasses are necessary. See generally RUBENSTEIN, supra note 6, § 3:58 at 346. 
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 25 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). Comment 25 
excludes absent class members from the purview of Rule 1.7(a)(1), regarding direct conflicts, but 
does not make such an exclusion for Rule 1.7(a)(2) material limitation conflicts. Id. (“When a 
lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit, 
unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes 
of applying paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule.”).  
29. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a)(1)(B) (AM. LAW INST. 2009); 
see also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1649, 1684 (2008) (conflicts that matter are “those that give rise to a significant potential for 
negotiation on behalf of an undifferentiated class to skew in some predictable way the design of 
class-settlement terms in favor of one or another subgroup for reasons unrelated to evaluation of the 
relevant claims”).  
30. Other scholars have offered competing typologies of conflicts in aggregate litigation. See, 
e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in 
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 385–93 (2000) (noting four “structural” 
conflicts in mass tort class actions, including allocation, settlement motivations, risk preferences, 
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members have inconsistent theories of liability or priorities with regard 
to case development. Allocation conflicts typically arise at the time of 
settlement, when the funds available to resolve a matter have to be 
distributed among persons who have competing claims to it. The fund 
from which competing claimants are paid can be limited because the 
defendant’s resources are limited; or because the parties have agreed to 
resolve a group of claims or issues for an aggregate amount to be 
allocated among participating claimants; or because the parties negotiate 
multiple claims or issues sequentially or simultaneously (from the 
“bottom up”), with the understanding that the claims or issues are 
interdependent, in that agreement on all of them is necessary to resolve 
any of them, which is what typically happens when parties negotiate a 
payment grid to support a settlement claims program.
31
 Tradeoffs can be 
explicit (“I will accept ‘x’ on issue ‘A’ but only if you pay ‘y’ on issue 
‘B’”), or can occur implicitly, as part of the ebb and flow of 
negotiations, in which parties are expected to prioritize and fight harder 
on some issues than others.
32
 Logically, the more issues or categories of 
claims the parties need to resolve, the more opportunities they have for 
tradeoffs. 
Resolving competing claims to a fund may entail a conflict even if 
plaintiffs’ counsel are genuinely motivated only by a desire to link 
payouts to relative claim values. However, when negotiating settlements, 
common benefit counsel are invariably concerned with more than just 
relative claim value. Because defendants condition class settlements on 
buy-in through “tip-over” provisions (pursuant to which opt-outs over 
“x” percent of the class give the defendant a basis to cancel the 
settlement), class counsel naturally feel pressure to spread settlement 
                                                     
and control); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1186–92 
(1982) (providing an early taxonomy of class conflicts). 
31. See Lynn A. Baker, Aggregate Settlements and Attorney Liability: The Evolving Landscape, 
44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 306–10 (2015) (evaluating existing definitions of aggregate settlements 
and offering a new normative framework); Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate 
Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769, 1813–14 (2005).  
32. See Shaheen Fatima, Michael Woolridge & Nicholas R. Jennings, Optimal Negotiation of 
Multiple Issues in Incomplete Information Settings, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS VOL. 3, at 1 (2004) https:// 
eprints.soton.ac.uk/259552/1/aamas04shaheen.pdf [https://perma.cc/LRD8-99SJ] (“Generally 
speaking, there are two ways of negotiating multiple issues. One approach is to discuss all the issues 
together as a package deal. The other approach is to settle each issue independently of all the other 
issues.” (emphasis in original)). See generally Peyman Faratin, Carles Sierra & Nicholas R. 
Jennings, Using Similarity Criteria to Make Negotiation Tradeoffs, in PROCEEDINGS, FOURTH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS (2000) https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/ 
253738/1/icmas00.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6AH-RLB8]. 
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payments to inspire maximum participation. Depending on the case, this 
could mean transferring payments that would have been made to high-
value claimants to relatively low-value claimants,
33
 or the opposite 
dynamic in cases where low-value claims are too small to economically 
litigate individually.
34
 
In the first few decades of the modern era, from 1966 to the early 
1990s, the adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) did 
little to regulate such conflicts, and more generally posed a relatively 
low bar to certification, requiring only that: representative plaintiffs be 
members of the class,
35
 they not have interests “antagonistic” to those of 
the class, and they retain competent counsel.
36
 The requirement of 
“membership” in the class, as applied, tended to bleed into Rule 
23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement, i.e., that the named plaintiff “possess 
the same interest and suffer the same injury”37 as the class members. 
That inquiry, in turn, focused on the class representative’s status or the 
relief sought.
38
 The further requirement that class representatives not 
have interests “antagonistic” to those of the class sounds like it created a 
space for a nuanced assessment of conflicts of interest, but, as applied in 
the pre-Amchem era, was read along the lines contemplated by the Court 
                                                     
33. See Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers as Agents and Trustees, 31 PEPP. L. 
REV. 301, 309–10 (2004) (citing prospect theory to explain why individuals with low dollar claims 
may be relatively less risk-preferring, so that funds have to be transferred to them from relatively 
risk-averse high-value claimants in order to induce them to settle). The think tank RAND 
documented a similar dynamic in asbestos litigation, where counsel with contractual aggregates 
packaged low and high dollar claims together, transferring amounts from the top to the bottom of 
the claim value pyramid in such clusters. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 
23 (2005). 
34. See, e.g., In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig. v. Thomson Corp., 654 
F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2011) (objectors successfully argued that named class representatives with 
stronger claims negotiated a settlement through counsel that potentially transferred value from the 
mass of relatively low-value claims to the higher claims); infra notes 80–88 and accompanying text. 
35. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157–58 (1982) (plaintiff with promotion claim 
may not maintain a Rule 23 action on behalf of a class of person with hiring claims). 
36. See, e.g., In re Unioil Sec. Litig., 107 F.R.D. 615, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (citing Blackie v. 
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975)) (“[C]ourts generally decline to consider conflicts at the 
outset, unless the conflict is apparent and at the very heart of the suit.”); Hedges Enters., Inc. v. 
Cont’l Grp., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 461, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (quoting Sley v. Jam. Water & Util., Inc., 77 
F.R.D. 391, 394 (E.D. Pa. 1977)) (“[T]he mere fact that a representative plaintiff stands in a 
different factual posture is not sufficient to refuse certification. . . . The atypicality or conflict must 
be clear and must be such that the interests of the class are placed in significant jeopardy.” 
(alteration added)).  
37. East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977). 
38. See, e.g., Trotter v. Klincar, 748 F.2d 1177, 1183 n.7 (7th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff whose 
equitable relief claims had been mooted was inadequate to represent a class of persons seeking 
primarily equitable relief). 
10 - Ratner.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2017  1:01 PM 
2017] CLASS CONFLICTS 795 
 
in Hansberry, i.e., as asking whether the representative plaintiff shared 
the class members’ “objectives.”39 When assessing counsel’s 
competency pre-Amchem, lower federal courts did not rigorously review 
to see if the class was sufficiently cohesive for counsel to be loyal to it 
and instead focused on counsel’s experience, knowledge, and resources. 
Counsel’s competency was rarely subject to successful challenge by 
defendants opposing class certification.
40
 In the settlement context, class 
counsel’s adequacy could be assessed by reference to the settlement 
terms; if the terms themselves were deemed to be fair, reasonable, and 
adequate, the trial court could “fairly assume that they were negotiated 
by competent and adequate counsel.”41 
But this same period witnessed two key innovations with regard to 
Rule 23 that eventually placed pressure on what had been, up until that 
time, a relatively relaxed approach to assessing adequacy. First, courts 
increasingly certified classes outside the traditional areas contemplated 
by the Rule’s drafters, e.g., civil rights and other cases seeking 
injunctive relief and low-dollar or “negative value” damages suits.42 
Courts certified classes even in mass torts involving personal injuries, 
where the cases at least in theory could be pursued on an individual 
basis.
43
 Second, courts became increasingly open to a variation of the 
“issue” class in which a class is certified for the limited purpose of 
evaluating and entering judgment upon a settlement.
44
 In such 
circumstances, the defendant typically agrees to certification of a 
                                                     
39. See, e.g., Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Ed., 117 F.R.D. 394, 402 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (citing 
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1940)). 
40. See, e.g., Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 147, 161 (D. Kan. 1996) (“In the absence of proof to 
the contrary, courts presume that class counsel is competent and sufficiently experienced to 
vigorously prosecute the action on behalf of the class.”); In re Computer Memories Sec. Litig., 111 
F.R.D. 675, 681 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (“Defendants do not dispute the competency of plaintiffs’ 
counsel, and this Court finds that plaintiffs’ counsel have ample experience and expertise in 
bringing securities fraud class action suits.”). 
41. See, e.g., Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 152 (D. Ohio 1992) (citing and quoting In 
re Corrugated Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 212 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
42. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617–18 (1997). 
43. See Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 858, 859 (1995) (noting that the fact of large-scale class settlements of asbestos 
and silicone gel implant claims “makes it evident that the class action has landed like a 600-pound 
gorilla in the arena of tort reform, where there has been increasing interest in replacing tort litigation 
with scheduled benefits like those provided in these class action settlements”); Judith Resnik, From 
“Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 5, 17–21 (1991) (reviewing the increasing 
willingness of courts to certify mass tort class actions in the years after the 1966 revisions to Rule 
23). 
44. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 618 (“Among current applications of Rule 23(b)(3), the 
‘settlement only’ class has become a stock device.”). 
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settlement class as part of a settlement agreement resolving the class 
members’ claims, but without waiving its right to object to certification 
of a litigation class in the event the settlement is not approved or 
otherwise does not become final.
45
 
It was in that spirit of adventuresomeness
46
 and innovation that lower 
federal courts looked to Rule 23 as a solution to the largest mass tort in 
history. By the early 1990s, the federal system faced an asbestos 
litigation crisis. The Chief Justice wrote in a 1991 Report: 
The most objectionable aspects of asbestos litigation can be 
briefly summarized: dockets in both federal and state courts 
continue to grow; long delays are routine; trials are too long; the 
same issues are litigated over and over; transaction costs exceed 
the victims’ recovery by nearly two to one; exhaustion of assets 
threatens and distorts the process; and future claimants may lose 
altogether.
47
 
In Amchem, the trial court approved a voluntary, Rule 23(b)(3) 
damages settlement class seen by the proponents as providing a global 
resolution to the crisis in the form of a negotiated claims program—a 
grid that specified payment ranges for qualifying injuries.
48
 The parties 
in Ortiz tried a different approach, certification of a mandatory 
settlement class under Rule 23(b)(2) to equitably allocate available 
funds.
49
 
B. Amchem’s Blueprint for Identifying and Managing Class Conflicts 
Though the settlements in Amchem and Ortiz raised distinct issues, 
partly because they involved different types of settlement classes,
50
 they 
                                                     
45. Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 
951, 95758 (2014). 
46. Id. at 617–19. See generally JAY TIDMARSH, MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE 
CASE STUDIES 20–24 (1998) (reviewing the history of mass tort settlement class actions); David 
Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 587, 652 (2013) (noting period in the 1990s when courts saw class actions as the “cure-
all” for mass torts). 
47. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 599 (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD 
HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 23 (1991)).  
48. Id. at 603 (describing the settlement as “an administrative mechanism and a schedule of 
payments to compensate class members who meet defined asbestos-exposure and medical 
requirements”). 
49. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 827 (1999). 
50. In Amchem, the Court confronted the proper standard for assessing settlement classes and the 
application of Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common issues predominate. Amchem Prods., Inc., 
521 U.S. at 591. In Ortiz, the Court confronted the definition of a 23(b)(2) “limited fund.” Ortiz, 
527 U.S. at 827. 
10 - Ratner.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2017  1:01 PM 
2017] CLASS CONFLICTS 797 
 
prompted a majority of Justices in each case to articulate and reinforce a 
common vision of the requirement of adequate representation as it 
pertained to the intra-class conflicts of interest. In both decisions, the 
Court applied the idea of a fundamental conflict broadly to include 
allocation conflicts stemming from varying claim strength or value, 
adopted a market or incentive-based approach to managing such 
conflicts by aligning counsel’s and subclass members’ interests, and 
privileged intrinsic process values over utilitarian concerns with fair 
outcomes. 
First, the Court defined conflicts broadly to include divergent 
preferences regarding allocation of settlement proceeds.
51
 For example, 
in both cases, the interests of persons who had already experienced 
asbestos-related injuries in receiving immediate compensation tugged 
against the interests of exposure-only claimants in ensuring the existence 
of adequate funding to pay for later-manifesting injuries.
52
 Similarly, 
though less appreciated, persons with claims of sufficiently varying 
value, such as persons whose claims were and were not covered by 
defendant’s insurance policy in Ortiz, could not be adequately 
represented by the same plaintiffs and counsel.
53
 Second, the Court 
identified subclassing with separate counsel as a preferred solution for 
such conflicts.
54
 Because the district court in each case failed to take 
steps “at the outset” to provisionally certify subclasses with separate 
counsel for such “easily identifiable categories of claimants,” there was 
no “structural assurance” of adequate representation during the 
negotiations that led to the settlements.
55
 Third, the Court rejected what 
it perceived as efforts to substitute an evaluation of a settlement’s 
fairness for an evaluation of conflicts of interest and their proper 
management.
56
 The Court demonstrated a “stubborn”57 commitment to 
                                                     
51. See Coffee, supra note 30, at 393–94 (reading Amchem to require that “allocations have to be 
bargained out among subclasses”). 
52. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856; Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 627. 
53. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 857 (“Pre-1959 claimants accordingly had more valuable claims than post-
1959 claimants.”). 
54. Id. at 856 (“[I]t is obvious after Amchem that a class divided between holders of present and 
future claims . . . requires division into homogenous subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B), with 
separate representation to eliminate conflicting interests of counsel.”). 
55. Id. at 83132, 857. 
56. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 622 (“Federal courts, in any case, lack authority to 
substitute for Rule 23’s certification criteria a standard never adopted—that if a settlement is ‘fair,’ 
then certification is proper.”).  
57. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Adequacy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 55, 55 (2010) (“There’s 
something admirably stubborn about the Supreme Court’s Amchem opinion. Despite being 
presented with a paradigm of efficiency—a global settlement for present and future claims in the 
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the intrinsic value of procedural fairness when it overturned the asbestos 
settlements in each case. 
Viewed only in the context of the asbestos litigation crisis that gave 
rise to them, Amchem and Ortiz make little sense. Why would the Court 
fuss about imperfect alignment of interests in a system that appeared to 
be deeply broken on so many other dimensions?
58
 The decisions come 
into sharper focus when viewed in the broader context of late twentieth 
century institutional arrangements for managing mass torts, and the 
theory of class conflicts and their management that appealed to the 
sensibilities of that era. That context explains why the Court adopted a 
market approach to conflict management that emphasized the intrinsic 
value of structural fairness. 
At the end of the twentieth century, federal institutional arrangements 
for managing mass tort and other geographically dispersed wrongs were 
largely ineffective. Due largely to jurisdictional constraints, federal 
courts were relatively small and weak fish in a sea of federal and state 
court judges. Mass torts were often grounded in state law, and federal 
courts’ diversity jurisdiction could easily be undermined by destroying 
complete diversity with the addition of plaintiffs who were citizens of 
defendant’s state of incorporation, or by selecting plaintiffs who did not 
individually meet the minimum amount in controversy necessary for the 
federal courts to have diversity jurisdiction. This left much mass tort 
litigation pending on a class basis in state courts,
59
 where the judges 
were perceived to be less sophisticated and to have a sometimes-cavalier 
attitude toward class certification, e.g., by certifying litigation classes on 
                                                     
elephantine asbestos litigation—the Court held that class attorneys could adequately represent only 
a class with sufficient cohesion.”); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life After Amchem: The Class Struggle 
Continues, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 373 (1997) (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 628) 
(“The Third Circuit and the Supreme Court have interceded to spare the ‘unselfconscious and 
amorphous legions’ of asbestos victims and their families the indignity to their legal due process 
rights that might have accompanied the prospect for monetary compensation in their lifetimes 
offered by the $1 billion-plus settlement.”). 
58. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 
1476 (2005) (“In the case of Amchem, the perfect was the enemy of the good: the multibillion-dollar 
settlement, rejected by the Supreme Court, was lost forever, and thousands of claimants who would 
gladly have traded their pristine due process rights for substantial monetary compensation have been 
consigned to the endless waiting that characterizes asbestos bankruptcies.”).  
59. See John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case Out of 
It . . . in State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 145–49 (2002) (describing the “anomaly” of 
pre-CAFA complete diversity and minimum amount in controversy requirements of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332 that kept many nationwide class actions out of federal court). 
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the pleadings, without proof that the criteria for certification had been 
met.
60
 
The belief in class action lawyers’ ability to choose plaintiffs and 
forum shop, including via the identification of “outlier” state court 
judges willing to aggressively use Rule 23,
61
 gave lawyers the 
appearance of control.
62
 But the same mechanism that gave plaintiffs’ 
attorneys the appearance of strength functioned as their Achilles heel: 
because their role as class counsel was contingent upon a court 
certifying the class and rendering a class judgment, and because other 
camps of plaintiffs’ counsel could easily file in a competing jurisdiction, 
settle with the defendant, and scoop the case, plaintiffs’ counsel 
experienced an intense and existential form of role-insecurity. Their 
investment in class litigation could at any moment be wiped out by an 
interloper, leading to what leading commentators saw as the most 
glaring ethical lapse of the era, the reverse auction.
63
 Reverse auctions 
occurred when defendants pitted competing camps of plaintiffs’ counsel 
against each other, awarding the role of settlement class counsel to the 
lowest bidder.
64
 
                                                     
60. See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 
1597 (2008) (noting that CAFA was driven in part by mistrust of state court judges). But see PUBLIC 
CITIZEN, CLASS ACTION “JUDICIAL HELLHOLES”: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS LACKING 2 (2005), 
https://www.citizen.org/documents/OutlierReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/BUS4-8ZA6] (“[T]his 
report shows that empirical evidence is extremely thin with respect to state court jurisdictions that 
are ‘judicial hellholes’ for class actions.”).  
61. Jay Tidmarsh, Living in CAFA’s World, 32 REV. LITIG. 691, 700–01 (2013) (describing the 
standard narrative of class practice in state courts as a “caricature”).  
62. See, e.g., In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214, 229 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting that one key 
aim of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (1995) was to shift control over litigation from 
class counsel to lead institutional investors). 
63. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 16, at 1370–73 (explaining the reverse auction scenario); Samuel 
Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 811–13 (1997) (same); Marcel 
Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of 
Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 775 (1998) (same); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling 
Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2000) (“[D]ueling class actions enhance the pressure to 
settle and increase the likelihood of inadequate settlements.”). 
64. See Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282–83 (7th Cir. 2002) (defining and 
explaining the “reverse auction” problem); In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 
55 F.3d 768, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[B]ecause the court does not appoint a class counsel until the case 
is certified, attorneys jockeying for position might attempt to cut a deal with defendants by 
underselling the plaintiffs’ claims relative to other attorneys.”); BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS 
E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 14 (2005) 
(“‘Reverse Auction’ is the label for a defendant’s collusive selection of the weakest attorney among 
a number of plaintiff attorneys who have filed lawsuits dealing with the same subject matter; in 
other words, a reverse auction is the ‘sale’ of a settlement to the lowest bidder among counsel for 
competing or overlapping classes.”). 
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This role-insecurity was seen as worsening two types of lawyer-client 
conflicts, the incentive plaintiffs’ lawyers acting for aggregates have to 
settle prematurely and also to trade class benefits for control and/or fees. 
Entrepreneurial, profit-maximizing plaintiffs’ counsel are naturally 
willing to invest less in plaintiffs’ claims than plaintiffs would prefer. 
The lawyers’ recovery (the fee) is only a percentage of plaintiffs’ 
recovery, such that the lawyers have the incentive to invest only as long 
as additional dollars of investment exceed the lawyers’ opportunity 
costs; whereas plaintiffs would like that higher level of investment that 
maximizes their expected recovery. Moreover, the lawyers have more at 
stake, and are thus more risk-averse, because they typically advance 
their time and costs. For these reasons, lawyers and clients’ case 
investment preferences systematically skew.
65
 The underinvestment/ 
premature settlement problem just described is distinct from the sellout 
problem, where lawyers, given the opportunity, might take actions to 
increase their fees at clients’ expense, e.g., by negotiating a settlement 
that involves reduced payments to clients but enhanced fees or other 
benefits for the lawyers. Both problems exist in all contingent fee 
settings.
66
 Add to that the difficulty relatively disenfranchised or absent 
clients have monitoring lawyers acting on their behalf, and such lawyers 
have both the incentive and the ability to peg investment at lower 
amounts than clients prefer, and to increase their fees at clients’ 
expense.
67
 These ever-present ethical challenges are exacerbated when 
counsel experience role-insecurity. The lawyers’ expected fee is reduced 
by the possibility of being scooped by competing proposed class 
counsel, further depressing investment; and the status of settlement class 
counsel is for sale, paid by winning lawyers by trading away client 
recoveries. 
Under those circumstances, a picture of class actions as both lawyer-
driven and deeply flawed emerged. One of its chief elaborators was 
                                                     
65. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in 
Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 41–49 (1985); Charles Silver & Lynn A. 
Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 751 
(1997) (describing threat of underinvestment by counsel). 
66. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 
CORNELL L. REV. 529, 537–46 (1978) (building on the Schwartz & Mitchell economic analysis of 
attorney investment incentives under contingent fee contracts); Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. 
Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. 
REV. 1125, 1133–36 (1970) (elaborating economic analysis that predicts systematic 
underinvestment by contingent fee lawyers). 
67. This is the traditional and prevailing account of the entrepreneurial lawyer. For a critique, see 
generally Morris A. Ratner, A New Model of Plaintiffs’ Class Action Attorneys, 31 REV. LITIG. 757 
(2012). 
10 - Ratner.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2017  1:01 PM 
2017] CLASS CONFLICTS 801 
 
Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., whose work the Supreme Court cited in 
both Amchem and Ortiz.
68
 Coffee saw the entrepreneurial (profit-
maximizing) plaintiffs’ attorney, not the class representative, as the 
driving force behind class actions, mapped the divergence between the 
interests of lawyer and class members, and recognized class members’ 
inability and unwillingness to effectively monitor class counsel given 
their asymmetric stakes.
69
 Professor Coffee couched all of this in an 
agency cost framework,
70
 identifying as a goal the management of 
agency costs.
71
 This, he explained, could be achieved by aligning the 
interests of profit-maximizing agents and their principals to minimize 
the loss in welfare experienced by the principal (the class) as a result of 
the agent’s (class counsel’s) disloyalty.72 This agency cost lens quickly 
captured the imagination of scholars and courts and now serves as the 
traditional, though not exclusive,
73
 conceptual framework for thinking 
                                                     
68. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997). It is important to note that while 
the Court was clearly influenced by Professor Coffee’s writings, Professor Coffee himself was 
critical of the framework the Court announced in Amchem and Ortiz. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 
30, at 373–74 (noting that the approach taken in Amchem and Ortiz “risks two inconsistent dangers: 
(1) it may do too little, and (2) it may do too much,” the former danger stemming from the 
continuing viability of settlement classes, and the latter from the fact that “an expansive reading of 
Amchem and Ortiz threatens the viability of the class action across a broad range of litigation 
contexts”). It is thus not at all surprising that Professor Coffee later testified in support of 
settlements, described below, that this Article presents as inconsistent with the Amchem regime. See 
infra note 218.  
69. See In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 
1040, 1057 n.13 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (quoting RUBENSTEIN, supra note 6, § 3.52) (“[I]n small claims 
cases [class representatives] have so little at stake that it would be irrational for them to take more 
than a tangential interest, while in all cases, including larger claim cases, class representatives 
generally lack the legal acumen to make key decisions about complex class action litigation, much 
less to monitor savvy class counsel.”). 
70. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic 
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
669, 684–90 (1986) (“Agency costs” are the sum of monitoring expenditures by the principal, 
bonding expenditures by the agent, and the loss in welfare experienced by the principal due to the 
“divergence between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare 
of the principal”); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976); Jonathan R. 
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative 
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12–27 
(1991) (defining agency cost theory and applying it to class and derivative claims). 
71. Coffee, supra note 70, at 726 (“[T]he basic goal of reform should be to reduce the agency 
costs incident to this attorney-client relationship.”).  
72. Id.  
73. Though the agency cost frame is most consistent with traditional class conflicts doctrine, 
commentators have proposed other intriguing lenses for thinking about conflicts and adequacy of 
representation. See, e.g., Myria Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency 
Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104–05 (2006) 
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about class conflicts, and was certainly the dominant conceptual lens 
when the Supreme Court decided Amchem and Ortiz. 
Thus, at the time it decided Amchem and Ortiz, the Supreme Court 
faced a landscape in which federal courts seemed poorly situated to 
regulate the quality of multijurisdictional class actions, class counsel’s 
self-seeking stood out as the central problem, and agency cost theory 
provided the conceptual framework for providing a conflicts-
management solution. Building on that foundation, the Court was 
naturally drawn to find some way to strengthen the adequacy of 
representation inquiry using a market or incentive-based frame, one that 
looked to the manipulation of counsel’s incentives.74 The Court 
accomplished its goal by stating what read like a clear approach to class 
conflicts: denial of class certification in the absence of subclassing with 
separate counsel whose fees turned on the subclass’s fortunes. 
But conflicts law is by nature far less categorical. Different doctrines 
regulating lawyer conflicts can be brought to bear in any particular 
circumstance.
75
 All conflicts analysis is, at root, a form of risk-
assessment,
76
 i.e., a consideration of the risk that an agent or fiduciary 
                                                     
(calling the agency cost problem in small claims class action a “mirage” because the focus in such 
cases should be on optimal deterrence rather than on optimal compensation); Jay Tidmarsh, 
Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2009) (drawing on moral 
philosophy and economics to assess adequacy by reference to whether “representation makes class 
members no worse off than they would have been if they had engaged in individual litigation”). 
Similarly, as discussed in section II.C.5 below, lower federal courts have searched for alternatives to 
incentive-based or “economic” models of conflicts management.  
74. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit 
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)) (“The policy at the very core of the class action 
mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any 
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by 
aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an 
attorney’s) labor.”). 
75. Compare Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 625 (using Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy of 
representation requirement to analyze conflicts that might justify denial of certification or 
subclassing), with Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999) (on a motion to 
disqualify class counsel, analyzing alleged conflict through the lens of ethics doctrine adapted to the 
class setting). 
76. Risk assessment is the foundation of conflicts analysis in a range of settings, including under 
the relevant ethics rules. See Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 71–72 (1996) (“Although various purposes have been ascribed to them, 
the ‘conflict rules’ are best understood as rules of ‘risk avoidance.’ They address situations in which 
there is a risk that a lawyer will not adequately carry out obligations to a present or a former client 
because competing obligations to another present or former client or because of the lawyer’s own 
competing interests.” (internal citation omitted)). Risk assessment also anchors court consideration 
of motions to disqualify opposing counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 594 F.3d 946, 954–55 
(7th Cir. 2010) (finding the risk of conflict insufficiently severe to justify a trial court order 
disqualifying counsel). Similarly, risk assessment is the foundation of conflicts analysis under Rule 
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will be disloyal as a result of competing duties to members of the 
aggregate or the fiduciary’s own interests. Implicit in all conflicts 
doctrine is an understanding that the risk need not be reduced to zero. 
Instead, conflicts should be managed to a point that depends on the costs 
and benefits. Amchem and Ortiz adopted that same approach by noting 
that conflicts had to be sufficiently fundamental to require subclassing 
with separate counsel.
77
 The Court did not precisely define which 
conflicts were “fundamental,”78 and did not identify subclassing as the 
exclusive method for managing conflicts. Thus, as the next Section 
describes, the Court’s seemingly muscular blueprint for managing class 
conflicts—i.e., an expansive definition of actionable conflicts, 
subclassing with separate counsel as the preferred response, and a 
commitment to intrinsic fairness values—contained the seeds of its own 
undoing. 
II. A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY REVOLT 
A person reading Amchem and Ortiz in the late 1990s would have 
been hard-pressed to predict how they have been applied to a changing 
complex litigation landscape. Especially, though not exclusively, in the 
very mass tort practice setting that gave rise to those decisions, the 
Court’s decisions are experiencing death by a thousand cuts. With few 
exceptions providing a veil of vitality, discussed below, the lower 
federal courts have steadily limited Amchem and Ortiz to a crimped read 
of their facts; narrowly defined the kinds of fundamental conflicts that 
warrant subclassing; accepted alternative structural assurances of 
fairness to avoid subclassing when they could not distinguish Amchem 
and Ortiz on their facts; and looked to the substantive adequacy of the 
                                                     
23. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1344 (9th Cir. 1980) (framing the risk 
assessment for purposes of determining whether representation is adequate as follows: 
“[r]epresentative suits carry with them an accepted structural risk that conflicts may arise between 
groups of class members. It may be unavoidable that some class members will always be happier 
with a given result than others, but potential injustice arises as the distribution of benefits and 
burdens in a class remedy becomes increasingly unequal”); Hernandez v. Cty. of Monterey, 305 
F.R.D. 132, 160 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (assessing adequacy of representation in a class action in terms of 
the risk that a conflict would materialize).  
77. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 636 (cautioning that trial courts should consider the costs of 
subclassing when exercising discretion to create subclasses).  
78. Professor Miller’s 2003 comment is apt today: “[g]iven the widespread recognition of the 
problems conflicts of interest in class action litigation, one might suppose that decisionmakers 
would have developed a workable and well-understood doctrine for assessing these problems. 
Surprisingly, however, the courts have not articulated coherent principles to guide their analysis.” 
Miller, supra note 16, at 582. 
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settlement as proof of procedural fairness, bringing a utilitarian Trojan 
horse into the adequacy of representation analysis.
79
 
A. Exceptions that Mask the Trend 
Three veils give Amchem and Ortiz the appearance of vitality. First, 
the Second Circuit has recently been the flag bearer of an atypically 
strict reading of those decisions. In Literary Works,
80
 plaintiffs’ counsel 
in consolidated proceedings represented a single class of freelance 
authors who sold works to hardcopy print publishers that were later 
published online settled the claims of copyright infringement with regard 
to the online publications.
81
 The settlement divided the works at issue 
into three categories, A–C. Category A and B works were registered and 
thus the copyright claims were relatively more valuable. Category C 
works were not registered and could only be litigated for damages if they 
were registered, in which case, they would share the same value as 
Category B claims.
82
 More than ninety-nine percent of the claims were 
category C claims, though many of the Category A and B claimholders 
also had Category C claims. The same counsel represented all three 
categories of claims, and negotiated a settlement that, not surprisingly, 
was disproportionately generous with respect to the more valuable A and 
B claims.
83
 The trial court rejected objectors’ claims of conflicts between 
on the one hand, the Category A and B claims and on the other the 
Category C claims.
84
 The Second Circuit reversed, noting that allocation 
conflicts based on varying claim value could rise to the level of a 
fundamental conflict requiring subclassing,
85
 and that subclassing with 
separate counsel was the preferred mechanism for assuring structural 
fairness in this case.
86
 
The Second Circuit explained why having a neutral participate in 
allocation decisions cannot substitute for the market-based approach it 
found Amchem and Ortiz to require: 
                                                     
79. See infra notes 256–77 and accompanying text. 
80. In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig. v. Thomson Corp., 654 F.3d 242 (2d 
Cir. 2011).  
81. Id. at 245. 
82. Id. at 246. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 247. 
85. Id. at 249–52. 
86. Id. at 253. 
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The Supreme Court counseled in Ortiz that subclasses may be 
necessary when categories of claims have different settlement 
values. The rationale is simple: how can the value of any 
subgroup of claims be properly assessed without independent 
counsel pressing its most compelling case? It is for this reason 
that the participation of impartial mediators and institutional 
plaintiffs does not compensate for the absence of independent 
representation. Although the mediators safeguarded the 
negotiation process, and the institutional plaintiffs watched out 
for the interests of the class as a whole, no one advanced the 
strongest arguments in favor of Category C’s recovery.87 
The circuit court therefore required separate counsel for the Category C 
claims and sent the case back so that the properly represented parties 
could renegotiate the settlement.
88
 They did, resulting in submission to 
the trial court of a revised settlement that was far more generous to 
Category C claimants, without reducing settlement payouts for Category 
A or B claims.
89
 
More recently, in Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merchant 
Discount Antitrust Litigation,
90
 the Second Circuit doubled down on this 
relatively aggressive read of Amchem and Ortiz, overturning the largest 
cash antitrust settlement in U.S. history on the ground that representation 
was inadequate.
91
 In that case, the same lawyers represented a Rule 
23(b)(3) opt-out settlement class of persons who accepted Visa or 
MasterCard prior to November 28, 2012, and, also, a separate mandatory 
Rule 23(b)(2) settlement class of persons who accepted Visa or 
MasterCard after that date.
92
 The court found that the interests of the two 
settlement classes conflicted, in that persons in the (b)(3) class were 
focused on maximizing the payment of cash, whereas persons in the 
(b)(2) class were focused on obtaining relatively more generous 
injunctive relief.
93
 The court found that the injunctive relief class, which 
received only temporary relief, but released its claims in perpetuity, lost 
                                                     
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 25758. 
89. In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., MDL No. 1379, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 50143 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2014) (preliminary approval order). 
90. 827 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2016). 
91. Id. at 234 (quoting In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 
F. Supp. 2d 207, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)) (“The (up to) $7.25 billion in relief for the (b)(3) class was 
the ‘largest-ever cash settlement in an antitrust class action.’”). 
92. The date was significant because the court preliminarily approved the proposed settlement on 
November 27, 2012. Id. at 229.  
93. Id. at 233–34. 
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that tug-of-war,
94
 one grounded in the opportunity counsel had to trade 
claims for one group to grease the wheels of settlement for another.
95
 
The court went out of its way to “emphatically”96 reinforce the argument 
made in Literary Works that active involvement of a neutral in 
settlement discussions was not an adequate alternative assurance of 
fairness.
97
 
The Second Circuit is an outlier.
98
 No other circuit court has adopted 
such a strong and straightforward read of Amchem’s requirement of 
subsclassing to address intra-class conflicts regarding allocation. Not all 
decisions emanating from that circuit hew as forcefully to the Amchem 
framework. For example, in Charron v. Wiener,
99
 a 2013 decision, the 
Second Circuit read Literary Works as applying with special force when 
settlement class certification precedes certification of a litigation class,
100
 
and only where claims were both released and “disfavored”101 under the 
settlement’s terms, putting a utilitarian gloss on the decision that could 
profoundly limit its impact, as explained below. In City of Livonia 
Employees’ Retirement System v. Wyeth,102 the trial court found Literary 
Works inapplicable even when a class of (low dollar) claims was 
disfavored as long as the settlement term was characterized as a 
                                                     
94. Id. at 234 (“The trouble with unitary representation here is exacerbated because the members 
of the worse-off (b)(2) class could not opt out.”). 
95. Id. (“The class counsel and class representatives who negotiated and entered into the 
Settlement Agreement were in the position to trade diminution of (b)(2) relief for increase of (b)(3) 
relief.”). 
96. Id.  
97. Id. 
98. See, e.g., Supplemental Declaration of John C. Coffee, Jr. ¶ 22, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-
02179 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2012), ECF No. 7726-4 [hereinafter Coffee Supplemental Declaration] 
(describing Literary Works as “the decision that has taken the strongest, most activist stance 
requiring subclasses”).  
99. 731 F.3d 241 (2d Cir. 2013). 
100. Id. at 250 (“As a preliminary matter, we note that unlike the situation in Amchem, Ortiz, and 
In re Literary Works, the settlement here was not being approved at the same time that the class was 
being certified. Where settlement and certification proceed simultaneously, courts must give 
heightened attention to the requirements of Rule 23(a).”); see also In re Payment Card Interchange 
Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 827 F.2d 223, 234 (2d Cir. 2016) (distinguishing Charron on 
the ground that Charron it did not involve a settlement approved at the same time as class 
certification). 
101. Charron, 731 F.3d at 252 (“This case therefore does not present the situation the Supreme 
Court faced in Amchem, Ortiz, and In re Literary Works, where the defendants were released from 
liability on certain claims that the settlements disfavored.”). 
102. No. 07 Civ. 10329 (RJS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113658 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2013). 
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“distribution threshold,”103 i.e., a minimum value of claim below which 
no payment would be made. And in Laumann v. NHL,
104
 the trial court 
limited Literary Works to (b)(3) cases involving allocation of monetary 
funds.
105
 
Second, the conflicts management regime articulated in Amchem and 
Ortiz has the veneer of robustness because intermediate appellate courts 
outside the Second Circuit still do reverse trial courts for failing to 
address conflicts via subclassing. But these decisions typically involve 
the types of direct and complete conflicts that were deemed 
impermissible before Amchem and Ortiz,
106
 or are rendered in cases 
where the need for subclassing is proved by the presence of unfair 
settlement terms, precisely the kind of inquiry Amchem rejects.
107
 
Finally, lower federal courts still regularly exercise discretion to 
certify subclasses. They often do so in order to make the litigation more 
manageable rather than to address adequacy concerns.
108
 When 
                                                     
103. Id. at *910 (“Literary Works . . . does not displace the string of precedent favoring 
distribution thresholds.”).  
104. 105 F. Supp. 3d 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
105. Id. at 404 n.73. 
106. These cases are often just variations on the facts of Hansberry. Examples include cases in 
which some class members actually benefit from the challenged conduct. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. 
v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1190 (11th Cir. 2003) (class included both end user 
purchasers of drug and wholesalers, but wholesalers benefitted from the challenged conduct, 
prompting the court to note: “[t]o our knowledge, no circuit has approved of class certification 
where some class members derive a net economic benefit from the very same conduct alleged to be 
wrongful by the named representatives of the class”). In the same vein are cases in which a 
proposed class includes persons who do and do not have continuing business relationships that 
tether their interests to those of the defendant, such as classes that include both present and former 
franchisees. See, e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 338–39 (4th 
Cir. 1998) (overturning certification of a litigation class on the ground that representation was 
inadequate; noting the conflict between present and former franchisees regarding the remedy, given 
that present franchisees have a stake in the franchise’s continued health; and noting the even more 
pressing conflict on the facts of this case between two groups of plaintiffs over the measure of 
damages). 
107. Examples include recent Third Circuit decisions that both sharply limit Amchem and Ortiz 
and, at the same time, reverse certification in cases where unfair settlement terms evidence 
counsel’s disloyalty. Two such cases—Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170 (3d 
Cir. 2012) and In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 346–48 (3d Cir. 2010)—are 
discussed infra in section II.C.  
108. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Because we are 
reviewing the district court’s certifications under an abuse of discretion standard, we affirm. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the plaintiffs could comfortably be split into two Subclasses based on 
their reimbursement scheme” for purposes of making the litigation more manageable); Perry v. 
Equity Residential Management, LLC, 12–10779–RWZ, 2014 WL 4198850, at *6–7, *10 (D. Mass. 
Aug. 26, 2014) (certifying three litigation subclasses, and noting that in general subclasses “may 
help make the case more manageable,” and that “creation of subclasses may circumvent 
commonality problems,” but appointing the same lawyers counsel for all three subclasses). 
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adequacy of representation motivates the courts’ exercise of discretion to 
subclass, it is often a motivation that disappears at the time of settlement. 
By way of example, in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,
109
 the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court’s certification of a 
litigation class and remanded for discovery regarding a possible conflict 
of interest between class members who were injured and benefitted by 
the challenged conduct. The case settled on remand, and the trial court 
certified a single settlement class, finding that the fact of settlement 
mooted conflicts concerns.
110
 
The strength of the regulatory regime announced by the Court in 
Amchem and Ortiz is best measured not by the extent to which lower 
courts feel they may subclass, but by the extent to which they feel they 
must do so to manage conflicts. The case studies presented by way of 
example in the following section illustrate the degree to which the 
foundation of the intra-class conflicts management regime of Amchem 
and Ortiz has been hollowed out. 
B. Two Case Studies 
Two recent case studies highlight the bankruptcy of the Amchem 
framework for regulating intra-class conflicts of interest. In both, class 
members’ divergent interests regarding the design and allocation of any 
eventual settlement were apparent at the outset of the litigation. 
Nevertheless, the trial and intermediate appellate courts either found an 
absence of conflicts, or found that any conflicts were insufficiently 
fundamental to warrant any subclassing or more than minimal 
subclassing. This subsection lays out the intra-class allocation conflicts. 
The following subsection identifies the arguments used by the courts in 
these and other cases to avoid or minimize subclassing with separate 
counsel, and, indeed, to upend and reframe the conflicts management 
regime outlined in Amchem and Ortiz. 
The two case studies presented here cross jurisdictions and 
substantive law settings. Each settlement or cluster of settlements is, 
though imperfect, impressive on a number of dimensions. The BP class 
settlements discussed below set a new gold standard, both on the merits 
with more-than-full compensation of many categories of claims, and in 
terms of the settlement’s design, with claims processes negotiated and 
disclosed in advance, making it one of the most transparent mass tort 
                                                     
109. 350 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2003).  
110. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., No. 99-MDL-1317-SEITZ/KLEIN, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43082, at *26 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2005) (granting final approval). 
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settlements ever negotiated.
111
 Similarly, the class settlement of the NFL 
concussion injury settlement was arguably generous given the 
weaknesses of plaintiffs’ claims.112 Settlements so dazzling make it easy 
to miss or overlook underlying intra-class conflicts. 
1. The BP Oil Spill Litigation 
The blowout, explosion, and fire aboard the Deepwater Horizon 
drilling rig on April 20, 2010, and the resulting oil spill and cleanup 
effort, together comprise one of the largest environmental mass torts in 
U.S. history.
113
 The resulting oil spill contaminated the Gulf region, 
impacting natural resources (e.g., fish), property, and businesses and 
individuals whose economic interests intersected with the region.
114
 The 
cleanup efforts involved the use of allegedly toxic oil dispersants, 
exposing cleanup workers to a range of short and long term illnesses.
115
 
These economic, property, and personal injuries gave rise to legal claims 
sounding in federal and state law.
116
 Within four months of the blowout, 
the Judicial Panel issued an order transferring and consolidating all 
actions in the federal system alleging economic loss, property damage, 
or personal injury claims to Judge Barbier in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
117
 
                                                     
111. At one point, BP even unsuccessfully appealed the settlement when it became dissatisfied 
with the settlement administrator’s and court’s interpretations of it. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 
739 F.3d 790, 799 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting BP’s appeal).  
112. In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351, 391–92 (E.D. Pa. 2015) 
(noting the risk that plaintiffs’ claims could be knocked out on defendants’ pending motion to 
dismiss on preemption grounds). 
113. In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon”, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 667 (E.D. La. 2014) 
(“It was not long after the initial explosions that the first lawsuits were filed. Since that time, 
approximately 3,000 cases, with over 100,000 named claimants, have been filed in federal and state 
courts across the nation.”). 
114. LOU NADEAU ET. AL., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE DEEPWATER OIL SPILL ON TOURISM IN THE GULF OF MEXICO 
REGION 1 (2014). 
115. Master Complaint in Accordance with PTO No. 11 [Case Management Order No. 1] Section 
III.B(3) [“B3 Bundle”] ¶¶ 912, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2010), ECF 
No. 881. 
116. Plaintiffs pursued federal statutory, general maritime, and state law claims, though the trial 
court ultimately dismissed the state law claims. See Order and Reasons [As to Motions to Dismiss 
the B1 Master Complaint] at 18, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. August 26, 2011), 
ECF No. 3830. 
117. Transfer Order, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-02179 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 10, 2010), ECF No. 1.  
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Faced with this “amorphous collection of claims”118 and the challenge 
of managing them within the confines of a single MDL proceeding, 
Judge Barbier immediately established an MDL leadership structure. He 
appointed nineteen attorneys to serve as members of a plaintiffs’ steering 
committee (“PSC”),119 tasked with coordination and implementation of 
discovery; coordination of selection, management, and presentation of 
common issue or bellwether trials; and the exploration and development 
of “all settlement options” pertaining to any claim.120 The court 
recognized that the administratively consolidated proceedings involved 
sufficiently distinct issues to warrant separate “pleading bundles” to 
facilitate motions to dismiss, including a “B1” pleading bundle for 
economic loss and a “B3” pleading bundle for personal injury claims.121 
The nature, strength, and value of these claims turned on a few key 
variables, including geography, type of profession, business or property, 
available remedies, and whether personal injury plaintiffs had yet 
manifested injuries. By way of example, claims that arose closer in time 
or physical space to the spill or to contaminants were arguably stronger 
than more temporally or physically remote claims.
122
 Pursuant to the 
                                                     
118. Edward F. Sherman, The BP Oil Spill Litigation and Evolving Supervision of Multidistrict 
Litigation Judges, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 237, 237 (2011). 
119. Judge Barbier appointed attorneys James P. Roy and Stephen J. Herman as interim liaison 
counsel for the MDL, pending appointment of an MDL plaintiffs’ leadership structure. See Pretrial 
Order No. 1 Setting Initial Conference at 13, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Aug. 20, 
2010), ECF No. 2. The Court then formalized the appointment and made Roy and Herman ex officio 
members of the PSC. Pretrial Order No. 6 at 1, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Aug. 
27, 2010), ECF No. 110. After soliciting written applications, the court appointed fifteen additional 
lawyers to the MDL PSC. See Pretrial Order No. 8 [Appointment of PSC and Plaintiffs’ Executive 
Committee] at 1–2, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 2010), ECF No. 506. One 
year later, after reviewing “applications for appointment and re-appointment” to the PSC, the court 
added as PSC members two additional persons. See Pretrial Order No. 46 [Appointing Plaintiffs’ 
Co-Liaison Counsel, Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee, and Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee] at 1–2, 
In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 2011), ECF No. 4226. PSC membership has 
remained largely constant throughout the litigation. See Order [Re-Appointing Plaintiffs’ Steering 
and Executive Committee Members and Plaintiffs’ Co-Liaison Counsel], In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-
md-02179 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2016), ECF No. 21767 (listing nearly all of the originally appointed 
counsel). 
120. See Pretrial Order No. 1 at 14–18, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Aug. 20, 
2010), ECF No. 2; Pre-trial Order No. 8 at 3–4, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 
2010), ECF No. 506. 
121. See infra note 335. 
122. See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, Liability for Economic Loss in Connection with the 
Deepwater Horizon Spill, DIGITAL ACCESS TO SCHOLARSHIP AT HARVARD (Nov. 22, 2010), 
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4595438/Report%20on%20Economic%20Loss%20Liab
ility%2011%2022%2010.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/KY6R-KNZM] (analyzing the OPA and 
discussing the relationship between concepts of “distance” and proximate cause). 
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Court’s decision in Robins Dry Dock,123 punitive damages were 
available to most economic loss claimants only if they were commercial 
fishermen or suffered physical damages and resulting economic losses 
associated with the spill.
124
 And persons who had already experienced 
physical injuries were differently situated from those who had merely 
been exposed or who had manifested minor injuries but were still 
susceptible to more serious and perhaps latent ones. 
The same undifferentiated group of lawyers appointed to the PSC at 
the beginning of the MDL resolved large pieces of the litigation via a 
series of class settlement agreements that made distinctions among 
plaintiffs based on the key variables listed above. These distinctions 
were obvious at the start of the proceedings given the experiences BP 
and claimants had with the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”) that 
BP unilaterally established and that Ken Feinberg administered to pay 
early individual settlements.
125
 The resulting class settlements have been 
praised,
126
 partly because the payouts exceeding $11 billion are 
impressive in the aggregate;
127
 but, as explained below, the settlements 
were reached via a process that invited tradeoffs among differently 
situated categories of class members. 
The settling parties and the court acknowledged the need for distinct 
classes with regard to BP on only two dimensions. First, building off its 
                                                     
123. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927). 
124. The trial court ultimately allowed certain punitive damages claims to be pursued (against 
Responsible Parties who satisfied the OPA presentment requirement and against non-Responsible 
Parties) to the same extent they could be pursued before enactment of the Oil Pollution Act, i.e., by 
“persons who suffered physical damage and resulting economic loss resulting from an oil spill,” or 
where there was “gross negligence,” but not for purely economic losses “unaccompanied by 
physical damage to a propriety interest,” per Robins Dry Dock. Order and Reasons [As to Motions 
to Dismiss the B1 Master Complaint] at 19, 27, 38, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. 
Aug. 26, 2011), ECF No. 3830 (citing Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 303). 
125. See, e.g., BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS 
FACILITY: REPORT OF FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 28–53 
(2012), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/66520126611210351178.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
EW9M-XQ4H] (describing claimants and claims procedures); Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus 
Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund 
Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 829–63 (2011) (describing genesis and structure of the GCCF). 
126. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the 
Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 399400 (2014) (praising the BP settlement). 
127. See, e.g., Report by the Claims Administrator of the Deepwater Horizon Economic and 
Property Damages Settlement Agreement on the Status of Claims Review, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-
md-02179 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 2017), ECF No. 22248 (summarizing payouts to class members); 
Status Report from the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Settlement Claims Administrator, In re 
Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 2017), ECF No. 22245 (same); Order & Reasons 
[Aggregate Common Benefit Fee and Costs Award] at 13–15, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02719 
(E.D. La. Oct. 25, 2016), ECF No. 21849 (same). 
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order requiring distinct master complaint pleading, the court certified 
separate settlement classes resolving all economic loss/property damage 
claims and oil cleanup worker personal injury claims against BP, which, 
as part of the economic settlement, assigned its own claims against co-
defendants Halliburton and Transocean to the BP economic loss 
settlement class.
128
 Second, in the subsequent punitive damages class 
settlements with Halliburton and Transocean, the parties recognized the 
need to distinguish between “Old Class” (BP economic loss settlement 
class members with BP’s assigned claims against Halliburton and 
Transocean) and “New Class” (persons with direct punitive damage 
claims against Halliburton and Transocean).
129
 
While each class had different named representative plaintiffs, the 
same lawyers have been appointed to represent all four of the 
aforementioned classes.
130
 These are thus not subclasses in the sense 
imagined in Amchem and Ortiz, where subclass counsel’s desire to 
maximize the attorney’s fee prompts them to seek to maximize the 
subclass’s recovery, thereby creating a structural assurance of loyalty. 
That vision is reflected in the Federal Judicial Center’s Manual for 
Complex Litigation, which assumes that if subclass counsel are 
appointed after a settlement has been reached, the trial court should send 
the parties back to renegotiate the settlement terms, with separate 
counsel representing the subclasses and fighting for the right sized slices 
of the pie.
131
 In a conflicts management regime informed by agency cost 
theory, subclassification without separate representation elevates form 
(subclassing) over function (managing conflicts) by leaving conflicted 
counsel responsible for mediating the very tensions that prompted 
subclassing. 
                                                     
128. See infra section II.B.1.a. 
129. See infra section II.B.1.b. 
130. Preliminary Approval Order [As to the Proposed HESI and Transocean Punitive Damages 
and Assigned Claims Class Action Settlements] at 30–31, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. 
La. Apr. 12, 2016), ECF No. 16183 [hereinafter PD Preliminary Approval Order] (appointing MDL 
Co-Liaison Counsel and Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee members as Class Counsel for the Punitive 
Damages Settlement Class). There is precedent for creating distinct classes without separate 
counsel. For example, in In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 149–51 
(E.D.N.Y. 2000), the court crated five settlement classes to resolve a range of Holocaust-era claims 
against Swiss banks and other entities, appointing the same counsel to each, in that instance in order 
to avoid what the court feared would be unseemly competition among subclasses and subgroups 
over a capped settlement fund. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18339, at *7–8, *44–45 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2007) (describing the unique circumstances of the 
litigation that produced this arrangement).  
131. See ANNOTATED MANUAL, supra note 6, at § 26.612, at 428. 
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a. Two BP Settlement Classes with One Set of Counsel 
i. Economic Loss/Property Damage Settlement 
While discovery and preparation for a trial on certain common issues 
were under way, the PSC and BP negotiated two separate class action 
settlements, one for economic and property losses and the other for 
personal injuries.
132
 The trial court appointed different plaintiffs but the 
same lawyers to represent both settlement classes.
133
 
The economic loss and property damage settlement agreement 
identifies fifteen named plaintiffs for a class that incorporates temporal 
and geographic limits
134
 and requires claims to fall within specific 
damage categories.
135
 For each of the eight broad damage categories, the 
settlement agreement establishes detailed claims matrices or 
“frameworks” distinguishing class members on multiple grounds.136 
Some of the matrices are actually clusters of grids. For example, the 
                                                     
132. Order and Reasons [Granting Final Approval of the Economic and Property Damages 
Settlement Agreement] at 23, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 2012), ECF 
No. 8138 [hereinafter Economic Final Approval Order]. 
133. After being informed that a settlement was imminent, Judge Barbier appointed the MDL 
liaison counsel, Messrs. Roy and Herman, as interim class counsel. Order Appointing Interim Class 
Counsel, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 2012), ECF No. 5960. Shortly 
thereafter, Judge Barbier appointed Roy and Herman as “Lead Economic and Property Damages 
Class Counsel” and “Lead Medical Benefits Class Counsel.” The remaining seventeen lawyers 
appointed to the MDL PSC were appointed as additional settlement class counsel for both classes. 
Preliminary Approval Order [As to the Proposed Economic and Property Damage Class Action 
Settlement] at 33, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. May 2, 2012), ECF No. 6418 
[hereinafter Economic Preliminary Approval Order] (appointing Roy and Herman as Lead Class 
Counsel and appointing the seventeen other PSC members as additional Class Counsel for the 
Settlement Class); Preliminary Approval Order [As to the Proposed Medical Benefits Class Action 
Settlement] at 22–23, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. May 2, 2012), ECF No. 6419 
[hereinafter Personal Injury Preliminary Approval Order].  
134. Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 7 (“The geographic bounds of the 
Settlement are Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and certain coastal counties in eastern Texas and 
western Florida, as well as specified adjacent Gulf waters and bays. Generally, ‘[t]o be a class 
member, an individual within the geographic area must have lived, worked, or owned or leased 
property in the area between April 20, 2010, and April [16], 2012, and businesses must have 
conducted activities in the area during that same time frame.’”). 
135. The settlement recognizes six categories of damage: (1) specified types of economic loss for 
businesses and individuals, (2) specified types of real property damage (coastal, wetlands, and real 
property sales damage), (3) Vessel of Opportunity Charter Payment, (4) Vessel Physical Damage, 
(5) Subsistence Damage, and (6) the Seafood Compensation Program. Economic Final Approval 
Order, supra note 132, at 7. 
136. See Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement as 
Amended on May 2, 2012, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. May 3, 2010), ECF No. 
6430-1 [hereinafter Economic Settlement Agreement]. For an overview of the settlement, see 
Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 6–19.  
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economic loss category includes separate frameworks for individuals 
and businesses, and within the business category is further divided into 
general, multi-facility, failed start-up, and start-up frameworks. Each 
claims program framework is described in corresponding exhibits to the 
settlement. 
The BP economic loss settlement was claims-made and uncapped, 
except for the Seafood Compensation Program, which was capped at 
$2.3 billion.
137
 The matrices made payment amounts contingent on the 
key variables identified above—time, geography, type of business or 
profession, and available remedies—in three ways. These variables 
dictated whether claimants needed to prove causation; the amount of the 
available “risk transfer premium” or “RTP,” a multiplier meant to 
account for, among other things, the risk of future losses as well as the 
possibility of recovering punitive damages; and the settlement awards. 
By manipulating these variables, the parties were able to estimate at the 
time they negotiated the settlement terms the likely payouts at the back 
end.
138
 
Given the obviousness and range of variables used to discriminate 
among economic loss/property damage class members for settlement 
purposes, arguments could have been made in support of creating 
multiple subclasses. Indeed, objectors did make such arguments. The 
settling parties used geography as a proxy for claim strength when 
deciding eligibility, proof requirements, and compensation within each 
settlement matrix. An expert for one unusually sophisticated objector 
testified that the Economic Loss Zones were drawn arbitrarily such that 
similarly situated class members were treated differently.
139
 Another 
group of objectors noted that Zone A and B members are entitled to 
relatively higher RTPs, and that, even though approximately eighty-five 
percent of the class members fell into Zones C and D, “[n]ot a single 
named class representative falls within Zones C or D.”140 Other objectors 
covered by the Wetlands Real Property Claim matrix noted that none of 
the named plaintiffs with such claims resided outside Louisiana and 
                                                     
137. See Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 78. 
138. See Economic Settlement Agreement, supra note 136. 
139. Economist and financial analyst Marc Vellrath submitted a declaration supporting objections 
by non-settling defendant Halliburton alleging conflicts within the economic loss “super-class.” 
Declaration of Marc Vellrath Regarding the Proposed Economic & Property Damages Settlement 
Agreement ¶¶ 3, 17, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-cv-07777 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012), ECF No. 91-2 
[hereinafter Vellrath Decl. re Economic Settlement]. 
140. Consolidated Objections of 795 Unnamed Class Members to Deepwater Horizon Settlement 
Agreement at 6–7, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-cv-07777 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2012), ECF No. 198. 
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objected to the decision to limit eligibility to make such claims to 
Louisiana property owners.
141
 
Allocation tradeoffs were made not only by geographic zone but also 
by profession or industry. For example, for individuals, the risk transfer 
premium—a multiplier on grid awards—varied between zero and three 
depending on both zone and industry, resulting in what one objector 
characterized as arbitrary payment differences among claimants.
142
 
Similarly, within the Seafood Compensation Program, claimants with 
distinct positions in a particular industry had conflicting allocation 
interests. The SCP compensated boat owners, lessees, captains, and crew 
“roughly in proportion to their respective shares of or contribution to the 
total value created through a vessel-captain-and-crew’s seafood 
harvesting efforts.”143 So when negotiating the grid to allocate 
compensation among them, each stakeholder would have wanted to see 
more weight given to his sub-group’s contribution to value. 
Counsel would also have been tempted to make tradeoffs among class 
members based on their eligibility to recover punitive damages. 
Recognizing that, objectors asserted allocation conflicts between those 
class members whose claims supported punitive damages and those 
whose claims did not. For example, writing about the Coastal Real 
Property Damage subgroup, Sturdivant Objectors claimed:  
Not a single class representative has a federal maritime claim—
or corresponding claim for punitive damages—for damage to 
real property. As OPA-only claimants, the class representative 
real property owners are not typical of class members, like 
Objectors, who have federal maritime claims for damage to their 
real property, which is the only way to recover punitive 
damages.
144
  
                                                     
141. Objections and Memorandum in Support of MRI, LLC and Dauphin Island Property Owners 
Association’s Objections to Proposed Settlement Agreement at 6, In re Oil Spill, No. 02:10-cv-
07777 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2012), ECF No. 144 (overall discussion is at pages 5–14); see also 
Statement of Written Objections of Economic Class Member [Panther Ridge] at 2, 13–20, In re Oil 
Spill, No. 02:10-cv-07777 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2012), ECF No. 190. 
142. See Vellrath Decl. re Economic Settlement, supra note 139, ¶¶ 175–77. 
143. Id. ¶¶ 223–24. 
144. Objections Regarding Proposed Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement 
[Sturdivant Objectors] at 3, 11–12, In re Oil Spill, No. 02:10-cv-07777 (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2012), 
ECF No. 214 (“As the Court has already ruled, those class members who did not suffer physical 
damage to a proprietary interest (unless the claim falls into the commercial fisherman exception) 
have no federal maritime claim (Doc. 3830, p. 38). Based on information and belief, the large 
majority of class members will not have federal maritime claims and will have only OPA claims.”). 
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These objectors asserted that separate class representatives “and 
counsel” should have been appointed to represent class members with 
and without federal maritime claims, within the Coastal Real Property 
Damage subgroup, and more generally within the settlement class.
145
 
Despite the material differences between their entitlement to punitive 
damages, both subgroups (those with and without physical damages) get 
the same RTP under the settlement, which Sturdivan Objectors 
interpreted to mean that owners of physically damaged real property 
were not paid for their punitive damages claims.
146
 
In rejecting all of these objections, the trial court and, on appeal, the 
Fifth Circuit, applied what is now a recognizable array of arguments for 
limiting the impact of Amchem and Ortiz, such that the courts found no 
conflicts that required subclassing.
147
 Those arguments are laid out in 
section II.C., below. Before turning to them, it is helpful to lay out the 
additional pieces of the sprawling class settlements the BP oil spill 
litigation produced. 
ii. Medical Benefits (Personal Injury) Settlement 
The MDL PSC that represented the economic loss settlement class 
also negotiated the separate “medical benefits” (personal injury) 
settlement, though it assigned a subset of its members to take the lead in 
these discussions.
148
 The personal injury settlement identifies eleven 
named representatives
149
 of a class of persons who worked as “Clean-Up 
Workers” as defined in the Complaint (and settlement) or resided in 
defined geographic zones within particular time periods, and, if a Zone 
A resident, who developed a physical symptom or illness “that is 
associated with exposure to oil/or dispersants or decontaminants.”150 
                                                     
145. Id. at 4.  
146. Id. at 5, 32–33.  
147. See infra section II.C. 
148. Expert Report of Robert H. Klonoff Relating to the Proposed Medical Benefits Class 
Settlement ¶ 76, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. August 13, 2012), ECF No. 7111-4 
(“The medical benefits settlement was negotiated separately from the economic and property 
damages settlement, and a different group of PSC attorneys led the negotiations.”). 
149. Medical Class Action Complaint ¶ 5(a)–(k), Plaisance v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 2:12-
cv-00968 (E.D. La. Apr. 16, 2012), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Personal Injury Class Complaint]. 
150. Id. ¶ 84. More precisely, the Settlement Class is defined to include three categories of 
members: (1) individuals who worked as cleanup workers at any time between April 20, 2010 and 
April 16, 2012; (2) individuals who resided in Zone A (Gulf Coast beachfront areas) for some time 
on each of at least sixty days between April 20, 2010 and September 30, 2010 (“Zone A Resident”), 
and developed one or more Specified Physical Conditions between April 20, 2010 and September 
30, 2010; and (3) individuals who resided in Zone B (Gulf Coast wetland areas) for some time on 
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In exchange for a class release,
151
 the personal injury settlement 
provides four main benefits to the class: a claims program for Specified 
Physical Conditions, described below; a Back-End Litigation Option for 
Later-Manifested Physical Conditions;
152
 a Periodic Medical 
Consultation Program; and a Gulf Region Health Outreach Program. The 
specified Physical Conditions claims program is a negotiated set of 
matrices for Specified Medical Conditions. Benefits vary based on, 
among other things: the reason for and source of exposure (e.g., as 
cleanup worker or resident); geographic region (e.g., beachfront and 
wetland “Zones”); whether the claimant was merely exposed or is 
presently injured, and, if presently injured, whether the claimant has 
experienced acute (short-term) or chronic (ongoing) medical conditions 
after exposure to oil or chemical dispersants; and the type of proof.
153
 
Eligible Specified Physical Conditions fall into a range of categories, 
including vision; respiratory; ear, nose, and throat; skin; 
neurophysiological/neurological/odor-related conditions; gastrointestinal 
or stomach conditions; and, for cleanup workers only, heat-related 
conditions. The Specified Physical Conditions Matrix is a 14-page chart 
that shows proof requirements and payment amounts by disease, 
worker/resident status, and geographic Zone.
154
 The chart also identifies 
“enhancers” (e.g., overnight hospitalization) and states whether actual 
hospital expenses are a prerequisite for recovery.
155
 
                                                     
each of at least sixty days between April 20, 2010, and December 31, 2010 (“Zone B Resident”). 
Economic Preliminary Approval Order, supra note 133, at 5. 
151. Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement, as Amended on May 1, 2012 at 103–
11, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. May 3, 2012), ECF No. 6427-1 [hereinafter 
Personal Injury Settlement Agreement].  
152. Persons who develop a “Later-Manifested Physical Condition” are entitled to participate in a 
“Back-End Litigation Option,” including a limited right to sue BP for specified diseases manifesting 
after a particular date, subject to BP’s right to “mediate” the dispute, and without the ability to 
pursue punitive damages. Order and Reasons [Granting Final Approval of the Medical Benefits 
Class Action Settlement] at 16–17, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2013), 
ECF No. 8127 [hereinafter Personal Injury Final Approval Order]. Importantly, this is not a back-
end opt out right, though it does serve a limitation on the scope of the release. The persons who 
experience Later-Manifested Physical Conditions are still class members, and are subject to various 
limitations, including limitations on elections of remedies, the issues to be litigated via discovery 
and at trial and proof, punitive damages, and venue. Personal Injury Settlement Agreement, supra 
note 151, at 57–58, 64, 66–69. 
153. Personal Injury Final Approval Order, supra note 152, at 8. 
154. Personal Injury Settlement Agreement, supra note 151, at Exhibit 8, ECF No. 6427-10. The 
Zones are demarcated in Exhibits 9–10 to the settlement. See Personal Injury Settlement Agreement, 
supra note 151, at Exhibits 9 and 10, ECF Nos. 6427-11 & 6427-12. 
155. Personal Injury Final Approval Order, supra note 152, at Exhibit 8, ECF No. 6427-10.  
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Again, given the obviousness and range of variables used to 
discriminate among personal injury class members for settlement 
purposes, arguments were predictably made in support of creating 
multiple subclasses with separate counsel to ensure a degree of loyalty 
when making allocation choices. For example, the medical benefits class 
included both persons who were merely exposed to oil and dispersants 
as well as persons who manifested physical injuries. The court opted to 
forgo subclassing presently injured and exposure-only plaintiffs, citing 
the declaration of Professor Coffee, who testified that “there are no 
‘future claimants’—persons exposed to a toxic substance who have not 
yet manifested any injury—who will receive any compensation for 
future injuries under the Medical Benefits Settlement Agreement.”156 
That testimony rested on Professor Coffee’s understanding that, even 
though Zone B and Clean-Up Workers are by definition not required to 
have an acute or chronic condition specified on the Specified Physical 
Conditions Matrix, they are nevertheless “injured” for purposes of 
general maritime law because the complaints allege they “inhaled fumes 
or physically contacted oil or dispersants.”157 Put differently, the BP trial 
court ignored the exposure-only versus presently-injured conflict in the 
personal injury settlement by assuming that, as a formal legal matter, all 
workers in a particular zone were not just exposed but also injured. 
Formal niceties aside, exposure-only plaintiffs arguably had an interest 
in negotiating a more liberal and generous Back End Litigation Option; 
whereas the presently-injured plaintiffs were interested in relatively 
greater compensation for their manifested injuries. Amchem is thus 
directly analogous. Even so, it is possible to distinguish the degree of 
conflict in Amchem and BP. The asbestos settlement did not have 
anything like the BP settlement’s Back End Litigation Option, and 
arguably undercompensated persons with later-manifesting injuries by 
failing to account for inflation when calculating payouts.
158
 Then again, 
the BP settlement’s Back End Litigation Option included features that 
call its meaningfulness into question, e.g., the requirement that plaintiffs 
elect between worker’s compensation and a suit against BP, and limits 
on evidence (e.g., re BP’s gross negligence) and remedies (e.g., punitive 
damages).
159
 Regardless of how well the settlement compensated 
exposure-only personal injury claimants, the structural assurance of 
                                                     
156. Declaration of John C. Coffee, Jr. ¶ 52, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Aug. 
10, 2012), ECF No. 7113-2 [hereinafter Coffee Personal Injury Declaration]. 
157. Id. ¶ 54.  
158. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997). 
159. See supra note 152.  
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separate counsel was missing. Separate counsel may have negotiated the 
same or better terms. We’ll never know. 
Instead of creating multiple subclasses with separate counsel along 
any of the fault lines pitting class members against each other for 
settlement purposes, Judge Barbier certified just two settlement classes 
against BP, and named the same lawyers to represent both. He granted 
final approval to both the economic and personal injury class action 
settlements with BP, dismissing objections regarding adequacy of 
representation and intra-class conflicts, and was affirmed by the Fifth 
Circuit on appeal.
160
 
b. Competing Punitive Damage Classes with One Set of Counsel 
In the economic settlement described above, BP assigned its claims 
against non-settling defendants to the settlement class. To resolve those 
and other claims, the MDL PSC negotiated two new class settlements, 
one with Halliburton, the provider of the cement used at the original BP 
drill site, in 2014,
161
 and another with Transocean, the owners of the 
drilling rig, in 2015.
162
 These nearly identical settlements resolved two 
categories of claims, those of the “Old Class” (the BP economic loss 
class described above), to end litigation regarding BP’s Assigned 
Claims, as well as those of a “New Class” of all persons with punitive 
damages claims against Halliburton and Transocean, only a subset of 
whom were members of the Old Class. The New Class was both 
narrower and broader than the Old Class. It was broader because it 
included “many claimants whose property suffered direct physical 
damage from the explosion and oil spill, but who were excluded from 
the Old Class. Among others, these include local governments . . . and 
                                                     
160. The Fifth Circuit affirmed final approval and rejected appeals asserting conflicts of interest, 
repeating the trial court’s arguments. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 796 (5th Cir. 
2014). 
161. HESI Punitive Damages and Assigned Claims Settlement Agreement (Amended as of 
November 13, 2014), In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2014), ECF No. 13646-
1 [hereinafter Halliburton Settlement Agreement]. The settlement benefit is primarily a limited cash 
payment of $1.028 billion to resolve both the New Class punitive damage claims and the Old Class 
assigned claims. Id. at 18. Additionally, Halliburton agrees to pay a reasonable amount for common 
benefit attorney’s fees and costs, up to a maximum of $99,950,000. Id. at 43.  
162. Transocean’s Punitive Damages and Assigned Claims Settlement Agreement, In re Oil Spill, 
No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. May 29, 2015), ECF No. 14644-1 [hereinafter Transocean Settlement 
Agreement]. Transocean agreed to pay $211,750,000 to resolve both the Assigned Claims (from 
BP) of the “Old Class” and the punitive damages claims of the “New Class” defined in the 
agreement. Id. at 17–18. In addition, Transocean agrees to pay common benefit attorneys’ fees and 
costs in the amount awarded by the court up to $25 million. Id. at 43. 
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oil and gas interests.”163 It was narrower because it included only that 
subset of Old Class members who could satisfy the “physical injury” 
threshold of the Robins Dry Dock rule
164
 and thus were entitled to a 
punitive damages award.
165
 
The same lawyers served as “Old Class” and “New Class” counsel.166 
The agreements they negotiated with Halliburton and Transocean 
expressly pitted Old and New Class members against each other, in that 
the capped settlement amounts had to be allocated between them. In lieu 
of seeking appointment of separate counsel for each class, the 
settlements relied on an alternative structural assurance of fairness—a 
court-appointed Allocation Neutral
167—to deal with the obvious 
conflicts.
168
 The Allocation Neutral proposed allocation of 72.8% of the 
settlements to the New Class and 27.2% to the Old Class, a 
recommendation the trial court adopted.
169
 
                                                     
163. Id. at 19. 
164. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927). 
165. Transocean Settlement Agreement, supra note 162, at 18. 
166. The “parties” to the agreements are listed as the PSC on behalf of the New Class defined in 
the agreement and the DHEPDS Class Counsel, for the BP economic loss settlement class. See, e.g., 
Halliburton Settlement Agreement, supra note 161, at 4, 11. DHEPDS (i.e., BP economic loss 
settlement) Class Counsel and the PSC acting for New Class to negotiate the settlement are the 
same persons. They are listed by role rather than by name. To underscore the point, Roy and 
Herman signed both as PSC Co-Liaison Counsel for New Class and as DHEPDS Settlement Class 
Counsel for Old Class. Id. at 52. The Court gave credence to that formal way of separating counsel 
and their roles, e.g., in its order appointing Wilkinson as the Allocation Neutral, which identified the 
parties requesting appointment as “Plaintiffs Steering Committee (on behalf of the members of a 
putative New Class)” and “DHEPDS Class Counsel (on behalf of the DHEPDS Class),” as if those 
were distinct persons. See Order Appointing Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. as 
Allocation Neutral at 1, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 2015), ECF No. 
15398 [hereinafter Order Appointing Wilkinson]. The same format is used in the Transocean 
agreement to refer to the same lawyers serving in distinct roles. Transocean Settlement Agreement, 
supra note 162, at 1–3. 
167. The trial court appointed Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinsin, Jr. to serve as Allocation 
Neutral. See Order Appointing Wilkinson, supra note 166. 
168. Declaration of Robert H. Klonoff Relating to Class Certification and Fairness Issues in the 
Proposed Halliburton and Transocean Settlements ¶ 32, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. 
La. Aug. 5, 2016), ECF No. 21423-1 (noting that Magistrate Judge Wilkinson established the 
allocation between the two classes and that “[n]either Co-Liaison/Co-Lead/Class Counsel, the PSC, 
nor any Class Counsel advocated for any particular allocation; it is my understanding that counsel 
were silent and neutral on the issue to avoid any perceived conflict”). The settling parties similarly 
attempted to address allocation conflicts within the Old and New Classes by delegating allocation 
decisions to neutrals. Id. ¶¶ 68–72; see also PD Preliminary Approval Order, supra note 130, at 9 
(describing appointment of neutral to devise a distribution plan for New Class members). 
169. PD Preliminary Approval Order, supra note 130, at 9; In re Oil Spill, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
165622, at *16 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 2015). 
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If Literary Works’s interpretation of Amchem and Ortiz had traction 
outside the Second Circuit, this would be a recipe for failure of the class 
settlement. Instead, Judge Barbier granted final approval of the punitive 
damage settlements.
170
 His Order and Reasons addressed adequacy of 
representation in only a summary way, concluding that “[t]his case 
suffers from none of the problems identified in Amchem,” in part 
because the class members were “protected by a specific, detailed, and 
objective framework that was developed and promulgated publicly by 
the Claims Administrator” and because “differences within the 
framework are rationally related to the relative strengths and merits of 
similarly situated claimants.”171 
2. The NFL Concussion Injury Litigation 
Unlike the BP settlements, which involved zero subclassing with 
separate counsel, the NFL litigation is an example of minimalist and pro 
forma use of subclassing. It falls in that cluster of cases where courts 
subclass only with regard to futures or other similarly limited categories 
of claims, without guaranteeing truly separate and independent 
representation, either because of the timing of the subclassing or because 
subclass counsel are pulled from a pool of existing common benefit 
counsel whose fees are not truly tethered to the fortunes of any one 
subclass. 
In July 2011, seventy-three former professional football players sued 
the NFL and a manufacturer of helmets, asserting as to the NFL that it 
“failed to take reasonable actions to protect them from the chronic risks 
of head injuries in football.”172 Thousands of additional claims were 
filed in over 300 lawsuits transferred and consolidated by the Judicial 
Panel to Judge Anita Brody in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
173
 
Judge Brody quickly appointed a leadership team of plaintiffs’ counsel 
to handle pretrial activity, including settlement.
174
 
                                                     
170. See Final Order and Judgment Granting Approval of HESI and Transocean Punitive 
Damages and Assigned Claims Settlement Agreements at 2–4, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 
(E.D. La. Feb. 15, 2017), ECF No. 22253.  
171. Order and Reasons [Granting Final Approval of the HESI and Transocean Punitive Damages 
and Assigned Claims Class Action Settlements] at 20–21, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:20-md-02179 (E.D. 
La. Feb. 15, 2017), ECF No. 22252 [hereinafter PD Final Approval Order and Reasons]. 
172. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d 410, 421 (3d Cir. 2016). 
173. Transfer Order at 2, In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-
md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2012), ECF No. 1. 
174. Case Management Order No. 2, In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury 
Litig., Case No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2012), ECF No. 64 (appointing counsel); 
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In July 2013, while the NFL’s motion to dismiss was pending, Judge 
Brody ordered the parties to mediate and appointed a mediator.
175
 Within 
a few months, the parties reached an agreement covering 20,000 retired 
players and providing a $765 million fund to pay for medical 
examinations and to compensate injured players.
176
 Concerned that the 
capped fund might be insufficient, Judge Brody denied the motion for 
preliminary approval.
177
 She appointed a Special Master to help the 
parties make financial forecasts, and five months later the parties 
reached a revised settlement providing for uncapped settlement 
payments pursuant to a settlement grid.
178
 
From the outset, it was obvious that any settlement would have to 
distinguish among class members based on a range of factors, including 
type of illness.
179
 The final NFL settlement does so through its central 
feature, an uncapped Monetary Award Fund overseen by a claims 
administrator that provides compensation for Retired Players who 
submit proof of Qualifying Diagnoses.
180
 The settlement recognizes only 
six such diagnoses, from varying levels of neurological impairment to 
Alzheimer’s Disease, Parkinson’s Disease, ALS, and death with chronic 
traumatic encephalopathy (CTE).
181
 The settlement releases claims 
without compensation for many of the symptoms of CTE, such as 
                                                     
Case Management Order No. 3, In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., Case 
No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012), ECF No. 72 (appointing additional counsel). 
175. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 422; Turner v. NFL, 307 F.R.D. 351, 363 (E.D. Pa. 2015) 
(noting the appointment of retired United States District Court Judge Layn Phillips as mediator). 
176. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 422. 
177. In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708, 715 (E.D. Pa. 2014); 
Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 364.  
178. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 423.  
179. Other factors that were used to distinguish class members in the settlement, and that were 
evident as possible sources of allocation conflicts at the front end, included age, length of service in 
the NFL, and the date on which a player died. See Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 367 (“A Retired Player’s 
Monetary Award is subject to a series of incremental offsets. The older a Retired Player is at the 
time he receives a Qualifying Diagnosis, the smaller his award will be.”); (“[A]ny eligible 
Representative Claimant of a deceased Retired Player who died prior to January 1, 2006 will receive 
a Monetary Award only if he can show that his wrongful death or survival claim would not be 
barred by the statute of limitations . . . .”). Objections made to the settlement on the merits with 
regard to these factors could have been pitched as adequacy of representation objections, but were 
instead mostly made and treated as objections regarding the adequacy of the settlement. See, e.g., id. 
at 407–08 (dismissing objections to the age offset). 
180. Id. at 365. The other two key features of the settlement are a $75 million Baseline 
Assessment Program that provides eligible players with free baseline assessment exams of their 
neurological functioning, and a $10 million educational program. Id. at 365–66. 
181. Id. at 367. 
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changes in mood, including depression.
182
 Moreover, the settlement 
compensates CTE death claims only for persons who died prior to the 
final fairness hearing.
183
 These distinctions represent tradeoffs made by 
counsel for the class when deciding how to structure settlement 
payments. 
Though one can imagine subclassing on multiple dimensions,
184
 the 
trial court certified only two subclasses, for claimants with and without a 
Qualifying Diagnosis. Counsel selected the representatives for each 
class: Shawn Wooden for other retired players with no Qualifying 
Diagnosis (i.e., no injury), whose primary interest was in a medical 
examination, and Kevin Turner for presently-injured retired players 
whose primary interest was in compensation.
185
 
The trial court appointed separate counsel for each subclass to 
participate in the negotiations, but they were appointed only after 
negotiations by all counsel had begun.
186
 The significance of the timing 
of the appointment of subclass counsel becomes clear when one reviews 
the timeline of negotiations: the formal mediation that led to the initial 
class settlement lasted twelve days,
187
 and the time period between the 
                                                     
182. Id. at 397. 
183. Id. On this last score, the trial court found that the class members were all equally at risk of 
CTE and that the class representative for persons who had not yet manifested a qualifying injury 
was, or at least alleged himself to be, one such person. Id. 
184. Public Citizen, a class action watchdog group, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=369 
[https://perma.cc/BUS4-8ZA6], put it succinctly:  
The flaw in the class certification can be stated succinctly: A small group of attorneys, 
eventually designated as representing two named class representatives, devised a benefits plan 
and a grid for determining settlement benefits that (1) includes only five disease categories 
(plus death with CTE prior to settlement approval), (2) contains significant offsets to 
settlement benefits based on age at time of diagnosis and eligible years played in the NFL, and 
(3) excludes from payment a large percentage of the class who have concussion-related 
conditions that are alleged in the class complaint. The attorneys for the class did not, and could 
not, properly represent the wide range of circumstances of the class as a whole in this 
settlement. 
Brief of Amicus Curiae of Public Citizen, Inc., in Support of Appellants Seeking Reversal at 2, In re 
NFL Players Concussion Injury Litig., Case 15-2230 (3d Cir. Aug. 26, 2015), ECF No. 
003112056130. Similar objections were made by objectors at the trial court level and on appeal. 
See, e.g., Objection of Craig Heimburger and Dawn Heimburger at 8, In re NFL Players’ 
Concussion Injury Litig., Case No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. La. Oct. 14, 2014), ECF No. 6230 
(“Two settlement classes are not enough for a fact-pattern this complex (and even if it were, the 
separate representation is questionable when each of the attorneys for each of the subclasses 
separately represented individual clients in the other subclass and did not ever disclose that 
conflict.)”).  
185. In re NFL Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 427–28 (3d Cir. 2016); Turner, 
307 F.R.D. at 372. 
186. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 429 (“When class counsel and the NFL began mediation, 
there was only one proposed class of all retired players.”). 
187. Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 363. 
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commencement of those negotiations and the reaching of a deal was 
only two months.
188
 So appointment of subclass counsel in that window 
left little room for counsel whose loyalty had previously been to all 
plaintiffs as a whole to adjust to a new, more tailored role. 
Moreover, subclass counsel were appointed from the group of 
common benefit counsel who had already been representing all plaintiffs 
in the MDL and were not only counsel for the subclasses, but were 
instead common benefit counsel for all MDL plaintiffs as well as class 
counsel for all class members who also happened to have special 
responsibility for advancing subclass members’ interests.189 They did not 
even have responsibility for negotiating a settlement of subclass 
members’ claims or issues and instead just “played an active role” in the 
mediation process.
190
 In the NFL concussion injury litigation, subclass 
counsel’s fortunes do not clearly rise or fall with those of the class 
members; instead, as class counsel for all class members, their fees 
could arguably be determined based on the value of the settlement to 
class members as a whole. 
Objectors unsuccessfully challenged the trial court’s limited use of 
subclassing, and, as to the two subclasses it created, the timing of the 
appointment of subclass counsel and their selection from among existing 
MDL common benefit counsel.
191
 Objectors relied on Amchem and 
Ortiz, on Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy of representation requirement, and on 
                                                     
188. Id. at 364. 
189. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 429 (“[C]lass counsel designated lawyers from the Steering 
Committee to serve as subclass counsel.”); Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 425 (“Pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(g), the Court confirms the appointment of Christopher A. Seeger, Sol Weiss, 
Steven C. Marks, Gene Locks, Arnold Levin, and Dianne M. Nast as Class Counsel. In addition the 
Court confirms the appointment of Christopher A. Seeger and Sol Weiss as Co-Lead Class Counsel, 
and confirms the appointments of Arnold Levin and Dianne M. Nast as Subclass Counsel for 
Subclasses 1 and 2, respectively.”). 
190. See Declaration of Robert H. Klonoff Relating to the Proposed Class Settlement in the 
National Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation ¶ 31, In re Nat’l Football League 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2014), ECF No. 
6423-9 [hereinafter Klonoff NFL Declaration] (“[A]lthough co-lead class counsel took the lead on 
negotiating the settlement, counsel for the two subclasses ‘played an active role in the mediation 
process,’” citing Declaration of Co-Lead Class Counsel Christopher A. Seeger in Support of Final 
Approval of Settlement and Certification of Class and Subclasses ¶ 27, In re Nat’l Football League 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2014), ECF No. 
6423-3)); id. ¶ 43 (“Subclass Counsel each performed their own due diligence and independently 
assured themselves that the deal was fair and satisfied the needs of their respective Subclass 
members and Due Process.”). 
191. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 42930 (noting, too, that for the first time on appeal, 
objectors also challenged the adequacy of representation where Arnold Levin, counsel for the no-
injury subclass, represented individual plaintiffs who potentially had already experienced qualifying 
injuries).  
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Rule 23(g), added by rule amendment in 2003 to separate out the criteria 
for appointing class counsel.
192
 A faithful application of Amchem and 
Ortiz would have led to an outcome that differed on at least two 
dimensions. First, at a minimum, the separate subclasses would have had 
separate counsel.
193
 Second, they would have been named at a point 
when subclass counsel could have assured that the settlement process 
was structurally fair, i.e., before settlement negotiations progressed.
194
 
Nevertheless, Judge Brody granted final approval to the settlement. The 
Third Circuit affirmed the settlement class certification and final 
approval order, and the Supreme Court denied petitions for writ of 
certiorari.
195
 
C. Lower Court Attack Vectors 
How did we get from Amchem to the BP and NFL class settlements? 
The range and intensity of conflicts among persons with different 
circumstances and claim values suggest that had the BP and NFL 
settlement class certification orders been before the Supreme Court in 
the late 1990s, the Court would have required subclassing with separate 
counsel on multiple dimensions to provide the necessary structural 
assurance of fair representation by aligning the interests of subclass 
counsel and the class members, even if that meant upending the 
settlements in those cases and prolonging the agony of litigation. The 
trial and circuit courts in the BP and NFL matters avoided that outcome 
by following attack vectors defined by the lower federal courts since the 
late 1990s. 
1. Limiting Amchem and Ortiz to a Narrow Reading of Their Facts 
Amchem and Ortiz involved conflicts among class members regarding 
settlement design. As noted, one conflict the Court highlighted was that 
between presently injured and exposure-only plaintiffs; but the Court 
also gave examples of how the presence within a class of diverse claims 
of varying strength and value can force counsel to make impermissible 
tradeoffs among class members. In Amchem, the Court gave the example 
of persons with loss of consortium claims, which were released but not 
                                                     
192. Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 373 n.27. 
193. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.  
194. Id. 
195. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 44748. The Supreme Court denied two writ petitions on the 
same day. See Gilchrist v. NFL, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 591 (2016); Armstrong v. NFL, __ U.S. __, 
137 S. Ct. 607 (2016). 
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compensated under the settlement.
196
 In Ortiz, the key example was the 
claims of persons whose injuries occurred before and after 1959, the 
end-date of availability of an insurance policy that potentially covered 
and thus impacted the value of claims.
197
 The settlement treated all 
claimants equally, without regard to date of injury, which troubled the 
Court.
198
 
Nevertheless, a number of courts have suggested that Amchem and 
Ortiz apply less forcefully outside the setting of mass torts inflicting 
latent personal injuries that create futures problems, writing as if the 
other categories of conflicts the Court also deemed problematic did not 
exist.
199
 This appears to be what the Third Circuit meant when, in 
Community Bank,
200
 it recently held that Amchem and Ortiz have to be 
applied cautiously because of their “atypical circumstances.”201 In the 
BP litigation, Judge Barbier’s lead argument in support of his finding of 
“no conflicts of interest among the class”202 was that there was 
ostensibly no futures problem in BP, implying that Amchem’s holding 
was somehow uniquely relevant to that category of conflict. Implicitly, 
                                                     
196. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997). 
197. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 857 (1999). 
198. Id. 
199. See, e.g., Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 638 (S.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 473 Fed. 
App’x 716 (9th Cir. 2012) (“This case does not involve contested insurance funds or present and 
future claimants.”); In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No: 3:08-MD-
01998, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119870, at *22 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2009) (“[U]nlike an asbestos 
mass tort action where unknown plaintiffs may develop symptoms decades later, this action 
involves an objectively identifiable class.”); In re Texas Prison Litig., 191 F.R.D. 164, 179 (W.D. 
Mo. 1999) (“The Court is aware that the U.S. Supreme Court has recently expressed concern about 
the use of class actions to resolve mass tort claims. The Supreme Court’s two overarching concerns 
have been whether the class is adequately represented and whether the class is sufficiently cohesive 
to warrant adjudication by representation . . . . Unlike some of the recent mass tort class actions 
which have been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court, this class action does not involve 
unpredictable damages that may arise in the future, or involve claimants that are yet unborn.”); 
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Leonard, 125 S.W.3d 55, 67 (Tex. App. 2003) (“The problems which led to a 
conflict in the asbestos cases were unique to personal injury cases.”). Commentators, too, have 
emphasized the practical importance in Amchem of the disparate treatment of inventory clients and 
class members, all of whom had only unfiled claims, though the Court’s holding did not expressly 
turn on that distinction. See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Is There a Future for Future Claimants After 
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor?, 107 YALE L.J. 2545, 2547–48 (1998).  
 200. In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 795 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2015).  
201. Id. at 393 (quoting Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n of Omaha, Local 385 v. Zalewski, 678 F.3d 640, 
646–47 (8th Cir. 2012)).  
202. Economic Final Approval Order and Reasons, supra note 132, at 31; see also PD Final 
Approval Order and Reasons, supra note 171, at 20 (“This case suffers from none of the problems 
identified in Amchem, where the Court noted a potential intraclass conflict, in the context of a 
settlement with an overall cap, between individuals who had already been injured by asbestos and 
those who had only been exposed to it.”). 
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Judge Brody in the NFL case—supported by expert testimony from 
Professor Klonoff
203—adopted a similar approach when picking out the 
futures problem as being somehow singularly worthy of attention. 
Similarly, lower courts have read the intensity of the concern with 
conflicts in Amchem and Ortiz as flowing from the fact that litigation 
was commenced at the same time a class settlement was presented.
204
 
For example, in Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co.,
205
 the Eighth Circuit argued 
that Amchem and Ortiz “each involved a situation in which the parties 
agreed upon a class definition and a settlement before formally initiating 
litigation, and then presented the district court with the complaint, 
proposed class, and proposed settlement.”206 This characterization of 
Amchem and Ortiz is technically true, but glosses over the fact that 
settlements in those cases followed years of non-class litigation.
207
 Yet 
in rejecting objections to a class settlement focused on adequacy of 
representation, the Eighth Circuit in Petrovic found that “heightened” 
concern for conflicts was not warranted due to the length of time the 
case had been litigated before it was settled.
208
 
2. Narrowly Defining “Fundamental” Conflicts to Exclude the Most 
Common Allocation Conflicts 
Allocation conflicts necessitating subclassing included, in Amchem, 
conflicts among class members with categories of claims of varying 
settlement value,
209
 and in Ortiz, claims of varying strength.
210
 
Nevertheless, the trial courts in the BP and NFL litigations found that 
differences in claim strength or value were not sufficiently 
“fundamental” to warrant subclassing.211 
                                                     
203. See Klonoff NFL Declaration, supra note 190, ¶ 34. (describing the Amchem and Ortiz as if 
the only relevant conflicts were between exposure-only and presently-injured plaintiffs, i.e., the 
futures problem).  
204. Charron v. Wiener, 731 F.3d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussed supra note 100 and 
accompanying text); Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1145–46 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(distinguishing Amchem and Ortiz because the settlement in the Petrovic case followed years of 
litigation). 
205. 200 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 1999). 
206. Id. at 1145–46. 
207. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821–24 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 600–02 (1997). 
208. Petrovic, 200 F.3d at 1145. 
209. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997). 
210. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 857. 
211. Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 34 (finding no “fundamental” conflicts, 
and that “[i]t’s perfectly fair and reasonable, and indeed common and accepted, for settlement 
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Some lower federal courts have gone so far as to categorically define 
“fundamental” conflicts as excluding such allocation conflicts. The 
Third Circuit has been at the vanguard of this approach to limiting 
Amchem and Ortiz. In In re Pet Food Products Liability Litigation,
212
 the 
Third Circuit rejected objections to adequacy of representation due to 
failure to subclass in a settlement of claims against manufacturers of 
adulterated dog food. The settlement distinguished among class 
members with varying claims and injuries and assigned different values 
to such claims in recognition of their relative strength. The court held 
that “differences in settlement value do not, without more, demonstrate 
conflicting or antagonistic interests within the class”213 and that “alleged 
differences in the strength of the various claims asserted in this class 
action do not, by themselves, demonstrate conflicting or antagonistic 
interests within the class that would require subclasses.”214 Other circuits 
have held similarly.
215
 
3. Invoking the Specter of “Balkanization” and “Holdouts” 
Lower federal courts have consistently used metaphors of geopolitical 
chaos and blackmail to justify avoiding or minimizing subclassing. 
These metaphors capture two categories of anxiety. First, the fear is that 
any amount of subclassing with separate counsel will cause conflicts that 
would otherwise have lain mostly dormant to bubble to surface through 
the adversarial process, creating a chain reaction of endless separate 
representation, a process courts and commentators label 
                                                     
benefits to turn on strength of class members’ claims”); Turner v. NFL, 307 F.R.D. 351, 376 (E.D. 
Pa. 2015) (narrowly defining “fundamental” conflicts as existing “where some [class] members 
claim to have been harmed by the same conduct that benefitted other members of the class”). 
212. 629 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2010). 
213. Id. at 346, 348 (citing In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 271 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“[E]ven assuming objectors’ characterization of the Purchase Claims as ‘strong’ and Injury Claims 
as ‘weak’ carries some validity, objectors fail to articulate how differences in the relative strength of 
the different claims would lead to conflicts of interest in class representation . . . . It appears to us 
objectors’ focus on the relative strength of the claims, like their focus on the disparity of the 
allocation, is more appropriately addressed as a Rule 23(e) adequacy of allocation question, rather 
than a Rule 23(a) adequacy of representation question.”); see also Petrovic, 200 F.3d at 1146–48 
(rejecting need for subclasses because almost every settlement involves claims of varying value); In 
re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. 3:07-cv-5944 JST, 2016 WL 721680, at *15 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (“The mere fact that ‘relief varie[s] among the different groups of class members 
[does] not demonstrate . . . conflicting or antagonistic interests within the class’ or adequacy of 
representation issues.” (quoting In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d at 272)). 
214. In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 347 (3d Cir. 2010). 
215. See, e.g., Petrovic, 200 F.3d at 1146 (finding conflicts regarding allocation based on varying 
claim strength and value to be insufficiently “stark” to require subclassing). 
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“Balkanization.” Second, the fear is that once such subclasses are 
formed, their distinct counsel will hold out for a greater share of 
settlement proceeds than is otherwise due to them, making settlement 
unlikely or possible only on unfair terms. 
a. Balkanization 
“Balkanization” is a metaphor for the descent into endless 
fragmentation. Applied to aggregate litigation, the fear is that 
segmentation could convert an otherwise cohesive group into “feuding 
enclaves”216 and that segmentation builds on itself, so that splitting at 
one crack in the aggregate ineluctably causes the whole thing to crumble 
into countless pieces. As a metaphor, it is used across jurisdictions 
within the federal system as a shorthanded for a more fulsome 
argument.
217
 It is worth unpacking: central to the metaphor’s power is 
the notion that there is no logical stopping point between any 
segmentation of representation of the aggregate and complete chaos. It 
assumes that all splits in the aggregate are equal, such that if any one 
warrants segmentation, they all must. 
Relying on procedural experts’ invocation of the specter of 
Balkanization,
218
 Judge Barbier in BP invoked the Balkanization 
metaphor when finding that “if subclasses were entertained, there would 
be no principled basis for limiting the number of subclasses.”219 
Similarly, in the NFL concussion personal injury litigation, Judge Brody 
                                                     
216. Coffee, supra note 30, at 374–75. 
217. See, e.g., Williams v. Rohm & Haas Pension Plan, 685 F.3d 629, 635 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“[O]ther class members argued that separate subclasses should be created to account for potentially 
different outcomes based on the statute of limitations. ‘[I]f subclassing is required for each material 
legal or economic difference that distinguishes class members, the Balkanization of the class action 
is threatened.’” (quoting Coffee, supra note 30)); Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. 
Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 629 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing threat 
of “Balkanization” as a justification for supporting the trial court’s refusal to subclass); In re 
Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 202 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Coffee, supra note 30). 
218. See Declaration of John C. Coffee, Jr. ¶¶ 29, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. 
Aug. 10, 2012), ECF No. 7110-3 [hereinafter Coffee Economic Declaration]; Supplemental 
Declaration of John C. Coffee, Jr., supra note 98, ¶ 19, ECF No. 7726–4 (asserting that objectors’ 
logic “could require an endless number of subclasses”); Declaration of Samuel Issacharoff ¶ 11, In 
re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2012) (“[T]he settlement process itself would 
unravel if discussions were held among a growing number of subgroups, which would then likely 
beget further subgroups by the same logic.”); Supplemental Declaration of Geoffrey P. Miller ¶ 19, 
In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 2012) (“Virtually every class action involves 
class members who are somewhat differently situated in a myriad of discrete ways. If sub-classing 
and separate representation were required for all such interests, class action litigation would be all 
but impossible.”). 
219. Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 35–36. 
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rejected arguments regarding the need for separate counsel for each 
subclass by arguing that “[i]f subclassing is required for each material 
legal or economic difference that distinguishes class members, the 
Balkanization of the class is threatened.”220 Judge Brody’s fears were 
also supported by expert testimony, in that case from Professor Klonoff, 
who wrote: 
If the subclassing process includes the many alleged injuries 
caused by concussions outlined by the Brain Injury experts, and 
if each of those injury categories is then subdivided based on 
age, length of eligible service, and dollar values, the required 
number of subclasses could easily exceed 50. Neither Amchem 
nor any other case requires the creation of never-ending 
numbers of subclasses.
221
 
To evaluate the correctness of the application of the Balkanization 
metaphor in these particular cases, we first have to ask, in general, 
whether there is any logical stopping point in any case between, at one 
extreme, recognizing no conflict as sufficient to warrant segmentation of 
an administrative or class aggregate, and, at the other, seeing every 
conflict as requiring segmentation. To answer, it helps to match the 
theory and doctrine of class conflicts sketched in section I.A., above, to 
the practical aspects of settling a mass tort. As noted, conflicts law 
assesses the risks of disloyalty in light of the costs of deeming a conflict 
impermissible.
222
 
The logic of settlement lends itself to the balancing tests applied in 
the case law, demonstrating the capacity of counsel and trial courts to 
identify the fissures that warrant subclassing. Settling parties naturally 
map the underlying litigation onto grids, which are used by lawyers and 
MDL judges when tackling pleading, motion practice, discovery, and 
settlement. Grids take shape long before they are embedded in 
settlements. In BP, the broad outlines of the grids later used to settle the 
proceedings were evident at least as of the filing of master pleadings.
223
 
Similarly, the parties in the NFL concussion injury litigation quickly 
coalesced around a settlement grid structured on predictable variables 
                                                     
220. Turner v. NFL, 307 F.R.D. 351, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting In re Cendant Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 404 F.3d at 202 (quoting Coffee, supra note 30, at 398)).  
221. Klonoff NFL Declaration, supra note 190, ¶¶ 39, 43 (“Again, once one goes down the road 
of subclassing beyond the two existing subclasses (presently diagnosed with a Qualifying Diagnosis 
and not presently diagnosed), it is hard to argue against additional subclasses based on player size, 
position played, and other categories urged by objectors.”).  
222. See supra notes 7678 and accompanying text.  
223. See supra note 125; infra note 245 and accompanying text. 
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such as length of play, age, and type of disease.
224
 Other mass torts have 
resolved on similar lines.
225
 
Putting together theory, doctrine, and practice yields a clear 
framework for preventing Balkanization. Trial courts may assess the 
fault lines within the aggregate that present the greatest risk, at greatest 
cost to affected subgroups, of giving rise to investment or allocation 
conflicts, and can create a limited number of subclasses along those 
lines. The “right” number of subclasses will depend on the facts of each 
case. The point is that the choice is not between zero and an infinite 
number, as the Balkanization metaphor suggests. Instead, subclasses can 
be delineated in a contained way using the kinds of balancing tests 
applied to grid frameworks that naturally arise in mass torts. We have 
already seen one example descried above—Literary Works. 
The “other” BP MDL involving financial misconduct claims provides 
additional support. That litigation is an example of segmentation of an 
administrative aggregate prior to any certification determination, which 
the rules enable, e.g., via Rule 23(g), which permits appointment of 
“interim” class counsel.226 MDL No. 2179, to which the economic loss, 
property and personal injury claims were transferred, and which is the 
subject of the mass tort case study described in Part II, above, was one of 
two BP MDLs created after the spill. The second—MDL No. 2185—is 
the proceeding to which the Judicial Panel sent all securities fraud, 
derivative, and ERISA litigation against BP prosecuted in the wake of 
the spill.
227
 That MDL was assigned to Judge Keith P. Ellison in the 
Southern District of Texas.
228
 Unlike Judge Barbier, who concentrated 
                                                     
224. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.  
225. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 223 (2007) (“Like 
workers’ compensation laws in the early twentieth century, peace arrangements for mass torts use 
grids to match medical conditions with compensation payouts in a systematic manner.”). 
226. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(3).  
227. Transfer Order at 2–3, In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 4:10-md-02185 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 
2010), ECF No. 1 (explaining why MDL No. 2185 would be separate from MDL No. 2179, the 
Panel noted that the “true factual focuses of these two dockets are vastly different. Plaintiffs in 
MDL No. 2179 will likely focus on the incident itself, the respective fault, if any, of the three or 
four primary actors, and the incident’s economic and other after effects. In the securities actions, 
discovery will likely focus on BP alone, its safety record over at least the past five years, and, in 
particular, the alleged duty of BP officials to recognize and disclose the likelihood that a calamity 
such as this might occur. Thus, the typical benefits of common discovery would likely be few”); 
Order, In re BP Sec., Derivative & Emp’t Ret. Income Sec. Act (ERISA) Litig., No. 4:10-md-02185 
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2010), ECF No. 58 (denying Transfer in MDL No. 2189, Transferring the 
Subject Actions to MDL No. 2185, and adding ERISA cases to MDL No. 2185). 
228.  Transfer Order at 2–3, In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 4:10-md-02185 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 
2010), ECF No. 1. 
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responsibility for economic loss, property damage, and personal injury 
claims in one undifferentiated group of plaintiffs’ attorneys, Judge 
Ellison split MDL No. 2185 into three consolidated proceedings within 
the MDL, each with its own distinct set of common benefit counsel, for 
securities, derivative, and ERISA claims, respectively.
229
 Judge Ellison 
divided MDL No. 2185 that way even though it meant that there would 
be some overlap in the discovery and other pretrial activity in those 
cases. 
Within the securities fraud consolidated proceedings in MDL No. 
2185, Judge Ellison also appointed counsel for a subclass in the early 
stages of the suit, choosing a single fracture in that case, which he saw as 
sufficiently significant to warrant segmentation. As of the time of his 
order appointing class counsel, there were seven class actions proposing 
classes of “purchasers of American Depository Receipts (‘ADRs’) and 
ordinary shares of BP during various time periods between 2005 and 
2010.”230 The subclass was created to account for the differences in the 
time periods on which the lead and subclass lead plaintiffs focused.
231
 
Armed with an understanding regarding how courts may selectively 
segment aggregates to manage conflicts in general, we can now critically 
examine Judge Barbier’s and Judge Brody’s suggestions that they were 
unable to do so in the BP oil spill and NFL concussion injury litigations 
in particular. Judge Barbier’s own case management orders suggest that 
he did in fact acknowledge discreet fault lines within the MDL aggregate 
as worthy of particular distinction and segmentation. He divided the 
proceedings between, on the one hand, economic loss and property 
claims and, on the other, personal injury claims, both by assigning 
separate pleading bundles to them at the outset and by certifying 
separate settlement classes for them at the back end, with separate 
                                                     
229. Amended Order, In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 4:10-md-02185 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2010), 
ECF No. 74 (recognizing separate consolidated proceedings within the MDL).  
230. Memorandum and Order at 2, In re BP, P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 4:10-md-02185 (S.D. Tex. 
Dec. 28, 2010), ECF No. 79 (consolidating the securities fraud cases and appointing lead plaintiffs 
and their counsel for the class and subclass). 
231. Id. at 11–12 (“While it is by no means certain that such conflicts [between the lead and 
Ludlow plaintiffs over the time periods on which they focused] would prevent New York & Ohio 
from adequately representing the class, the Court finds it particularly important at this early stage of 
the case to avoid prejudicing the claims of absent class members through the appointment of a lead 
plaintiff who cannot fully and fairly represent them. Because New York & Ohio’s losses are 
concentrated outside the Ludlow Period, and because that concentration leads New York & Ohio to 
present different legal theories than other plaintiffs, they have not made a preliminary showing of 
typicality and adequacy. Therefore, New York & Ohio are not entitled to a presumption that they 
are the most adequate lead plaintiffs.”).  
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representative plaintiffs.
232
 Similarly, in the NFL litigation, Judge Brody 
was able to contain subclassing to two groups, those with and without 
Qualifying Diagnoses, without causing conflicts to multiply endlessly, 
and could have similarly drawn the line at a higher number without 
losing control.
233
 
The distortion at the heart of the Balkanization metaphor is that 
fragmentation is somehow something that happens to a litigation, as if 
the judge is powerless to control it. Trial courts in the BP oil spill and 
NFL concussion injury litigations adopted this position. But in fact, 
Literary Works and the “other” BP litigations reveal that the opposite is 
true.
234
 Trial court judges can assess the costs and benefits of carving 
classes at obvious joints to create a level of competition that harnesses 
some of the energy of competition without igniting a chain reaction of 
endless fragmentation. 
b. Holdouts 
A related source of resistance to subclassing with separate counsel is 
the fear that counsel whose fees are tied to subgroup outcomes will 
engage in extortion to increase their subgroup’s share and thus their 
expected attorney’s fees.235 To put the fear in some context, it should be 
noted that all settlement is a form of extortion. The plaintiff threatens 
continued litigation and a possible judgment if the defendant refuses to 
settle on terms the plaintiff finds acceptable. Extortion is a two-way 
street, in that defendant can threaten high litigation costs and the 
possibility of extinguishing that claim if plaintiff fails to agree to what 
the defendant offers. In that light, extortion by subclasses is just another 
way of describing negotiation of their interests. 
The real fear is of opportunistic holdouts, i.e., those who are offered a 
“reasonable” amount for a claim, but hold out for more, not seeking just 
full claim value but instead seeking to capture a disproportionate share 
of any settlement pie in exchange for discontinuing their obstruction of a 
global peace. Logically, the more an aggregate is segmented, the more 
persons there are who have the power to hold any settlement hostage. 
                                                     
232. See supra section II.B.1.a.  
233. See supra section II.B.1.b. 
234. See supra notes 8089, 22732 and accompanying text.  
235. See generally Coffee, supra note 30, at 435–36 (“[T]he more subclasses that are required, 
the greater the danger that one subclass will hold out.”); John C. Coffee Jr., Rethinking the Class 
Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625, 655 (1987) (“[I]f any subclass can prevent the 
settlement’s overall approval, the prospect for extortion is high.”). 
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There is truth to the holdout argument to this extent: settling parties 
would naturally prefer to have the counsel appointed to represent each 
subset of the aggregate on board before concluding a global settlement. 
However, counsel for subgroups do not have an actual veto power over 
the settlement of those claims in either the class or the non-class setting. 
If Rule 23 is used as the vehicle for providing closure in a global 
settlement, a subset of counsel may bring a proposed class settlement to 
the court, even over the objection of dissenting plaintiffs or counsel.
236
 
Objections by counsel appointed to do common benefit work and to 
serve as interim class counsel for a subgroup may cause friction at the 
time of a global settlement. But such objections by themselves cannot 
prevent a global settlement. The power to hold out is thus limited. 
4. The Mystique of Uncapped Settlement Funds 
Trial courts in the BP
237
 and NFL
238
 litigations argued that because 
the funds were (mostly) uncapped, there were no conflicts of interest. 
Supported by reports and affidavits from legal scholars,
239
 Judge Barbier 
found that the uncapped nature of the funds (other than the Seafood 
Compensation Program, which was capped) meant that settling parties 
did not need to, and thus did not, make tradeoffs among claimants.
240
 
The assumption was that if BP was willing to pay all claims pursuant to 
the negotiated matrices, then there was no tension among class members, 
because each would get whatever he deserved. Similarly, Judge Brody 
held that the uncapped, inflation-adjusted nature of the fund in the NFL 
                                                     
236.  See, e.g., In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1984) (subset of 
plaintiffs’ counsel unsuccessfully represented objecting plaintiffs). See generally MANUAL, supra 
note 1, at § 21.642.  
237.  Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 31 (“There are no conflicts of interest 
among the class.”). 
238.  In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d 410, 432 (3d Cir. 2016). 
239.  Professors John C. Coffee, Jr., Samuel Issacharoff, Robert Klonoff, and Geoffrey Miller 
submitted reports or affidavits in support of the BP settlements. Coffee, Issacharoff and Klonoff 
opined that the uncapped nature of the settlement funds for programs other than seafood, and the 
high ceiling on the SCP fund, meant that there were no conflicts among settlement class members. 
See, e.g., Coffee Economic Declaration, supra note 218, ¶¶ 8, 23–24; Declaration of Samuel 
Issacharoff ¶ 14, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2012), ECF No. 7101-6; 
Expert Report of Robert H. Klonoff Relating to the Proposed Economic and Property Damages 
Class Settlement ¶¶ 31, 36, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2012), ECF No. 
7101-5 (claimants were “not competing for limited dollars”). 
240.  Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 3132 (“[M]ost importantly, this 
Settlement does not involve a limited fund. . . . [T]he claims frameworks offering generally 
uncapped compensation ensure that a benefit paid to one member of the class will in no way reduce 
or interfere with a benefit obtained by another member.”). 
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settlement was a “structural” protection that lessened concerns regarding 
conflicts.
241
 
One can see why the distinction between capped and uncapped, 
claims-made settlements is illusory by looking at the BP litigation. BP 
viewed its liability in the aggregate, as a total estimated dollar figure. 
When negotiating the settlement matrices, BP undoubtedly had some 
target figure in mind as the price it was willing to pay to secure legal 
closure. It could have simply negotiated a settlement for that figure, 
placing the risk on plaintiffs that the amount was too low to satisfy all 
claims. Indeed, BP took exactly that approach when negotiating the 
Seafood Compensation Program.
242
 As to other claim categories, BP 
elected to take an alternative path, reaching the same figure it was 
willing to pay for legal peace, but instead by negotiating grids with fixed 
eligibility, proof requirements, and awards, adjusting those variables to 
reach an estimated global target payout.
243
 That approach placed the risk 
on BP that claims and claims payments would exceed its estimated total 
liability. BP was likely willing to take the risk in this case because it had 
access to substantial claims data from two sources, the GCCF it 
established pursuant to its obligations to pay economic loss and property 
damage claims,
244
 and, with regard to the personal injury claims 
discussed in the next section, from a Medical Encounters Database 
maintained in real time to track worker complaints during the cleanup 
process.
245
 
Because, as noted, the BP Seafood Compensation Program was a 
capped fund, the matrices that constitute it even more obviously 
represent negotiated allocations among competing claimants. Judge 
Barbier held that the amount of the $2.3 billion SCP fund was 
sufficiently high that tradeoffs among class members did not need to be 
made within it,
246
 a variation of the uncapped fund argument addressed 
above. Even if there was a windfall in the fund, however, its allocation 
among persons with competing claims to it would categorically put those 
persons in tension with each other. 
                                                     
241. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 432; Turner v. NFL, 307 F.R.D. 351, 376–77 (E.D. Pa. 
2015). 
242. See Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 78. 
243. See supra note 136. 
244. See supra note 125. 
245. Coffee Personal Injury Declaration, supra note 156, ¶¶ 42–51 (describing Medical 
Encounters Database). 
246.  Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 32–33. 
10 - Ratner.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2017  1:01 PM 
836 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:785 
 
5. Alternative Structural Assurances of Fairness 
Courts often point to the participation of court-appointed neutrals in 
settlement negotiations as an alternative structural assurance of fairness 
that obviates the need for subclassing, though typically without 
addressing concern regarding information asymmetries between counsel 
and neutrals that led the Second Circuit to reject that equation in Literary 
Works.
247
 Judge Barbier made a similar argument in the BP case, 
asserting that no conflicts existed in part because “Magistrate Judge 
Shushan’s involvement further ensured structural integrity during the 
negotiations.”248 In the NFL concussion injury litigation, after denying 
the parties’ motion for preliminary approval of a settlement that resulted 
from court-supervised mediation, the trial court directed the parties to 
share expert actuarial information with Special Master Perry Golkin, an 
expert in finance. Special Master Golkin also supervised discussion 
designed to address the trial court’s concern that the initial capped 
settlement amount might be insufficient. The court found that the 
presence of a mediator and special master in the negotiation process 
provided assurance of fairness.
249
 
In BP, Judge Barbier found another way around a strict read of 
Amchem by attempting to equate as alternative structural assurances of 
fairness on the one hand, Amchem’s attorney-fee-based approach to 
interest alignment and, on the other, the representativeness and 
inclusiveness of the steering committee.
250
 Appointing a representative 
and inclusive steering committee is a best practice. The MANUAL 
proposes diversity within the steering committee.
251
 Professor Burch 
proposes “encouraging input and dissent”252 from non-repeat players and 
non-lead lawyers and appointment of steering committees that reflect the 
diversity among the members of the aggregate.
253
 These suggestions are 
                                                     
247. See Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1324 n.25 (11th Cir. 2012) (“We are not the first 
court to suggest that Amchem and Ortiz impose a requirement of adequate structural assurances, as 
opposed to a per se requirement of formally designated subclasses.”); 3 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7.31, at 160 (5th ed. 2013) (citing Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 
1241, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
248. Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 33. 
249. Turner v. NFL, 307 F.R.D. 351, 377 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (“Moreover, the presence of Mediator 
Judge Phillips and Special Master Golkin helped guarantee that the Parties did not compromise 
some Class Members’ claims in order to benefit other Class Members.”).  
250. See infra notes 25155 and accompanying text. 
251. See MANUAL, supra note 1, § 10.224 (“[W]here diverse interests exist among the parties, the 
court may designate a committee of counsel representing different interests.”). 
252. Burch, supra note 15, at 77, 120–21. 
253. Id. at 122–23. 
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helpful with respect to creating conditions under which concerns of 
disparate interests within the aggregate might be voiced and squarely fit 
Professor Burch’s interest in cognition.254 But they do not fit a model of 
conflict management rooted in economic theory, which requires that 
counsel’s financial interests align with those of distinct sub-groups of 
plaintiffs. Nevertheless Judge Barbier asserted the BP steering 
committee’s representativeness and inclusiveness as a response to 
adequacy objections regarding class counsel’s incentives. He noted: 
“[t]he PSC was consulted and participated throughout the settlement 
process. Whenever a particular category of claims was discussed during 
negotiations, lawyers who had clients with such claims took an active 
role in advising the negotiators.”255 That consultative approach left the 
negotiators, though more fully informed, still conflicted, e.g., regarding 
allocation with regard to competing claims. 
6. Proof in the Pudding—A Utilitarian Wedge 
The Supreme Court was adamant that the lower courts resist the urge 
to conflate the 23(a)(4) adequacy and 23(e) settlement fairness 
inquiries.
256
 Courts today have found a new way to link the two 
inquiries. First, if courts believe that compensation amounts are 
reasonable under the circumstances, they discount the possibility that 
there were tradeoffs among class members. For example, in his order 
granting final approval to the BP economic loss class settlement, Judge 
Barbier noted that there were no conflicts in part because “[t]he 
differences within the [settlement] frameworks developed through arms-
length negotiation, are rationally related to the strengths and merits of 
similarly situated claims.”257 Similarly, in the NFL litigation, the 
appellate court found that “the terms of the settlement reflect that the 
interests of current and future claimants were represented in the 
negotiations,” because the terms were fair to both groups.258 Other lower 
                                                     
254. Id. at 121 (“[L]everaging outsiders’ expertise is a more viable means of achieving cognitive 
diversity.”). See also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109, 
1156–60 (2011) (reviewing and applying the cognitive diversity literature to the selection of lead 
plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions under the PSLRA). 
255. Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 32. 
256. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622 (1997).  
257. Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 31. 
258. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d 410, 43233 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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federal courts have adopted similar approaches.
259
 Assessing common 
practices, the Sixth Circuit observed: 
[C]ourts customarily demand evidence of improper incentives 
for the class representatives or class counsel—such as a promise 
of excessive attorney fees in return for a low-cost, expedited 
settlement—before abandoning the presumption that the class 
representatives and counsel handled their responsibilities with 
the independent vigor that the adversarial process demands.
260
 
Second, lower courts have suggested that if settlement terms are 
structured in an unfair way so as to disadvantage subsets of class 
members without justification, then a fundamental conflict may be found 
to exist. For example, in Dewey v. Volkswagen,
261
 the Third Circuit 
confronted a settlement of a product defect case involving various 
models of Volkswagen and Audi vehicles with sunroofs that were 
allegedly defectively designed and thus prone to leaking without special 
maintenance. The settlement provided various kinds of relief, including 
most importantly an $8 million fund,
262
 which prompted objectors to 
allege two different types of conflicts of interest. The Third Circuit’s 
disparate treatment of them demonstrates the utilitarian creep that has 
shaped application of Amchem and Ortiz in the years since they were 
decided. 
First, objectors in Dewey argued that the settlement implicated the 
futures problem that so prominently figured in Amchem because the 
named plaintiffs, who had all already suffered sunroof leaks, represented 
a class that also included persons who had not.
263
 Objectors alleged that 
persons who already suffered leaks had an interest in ensuring generous 
immediate compensation, and were relatively less interested in assuring 
compensation for failure to inform the class, or in assuring compensation 
for “future protections,”264 such as inspections and funding for payment 
of future damage claims. The Third Circuit acknowledged that “[t]his 
                                                     
259. For example, in In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed a trial court’s finding that representation was adequate even though class counsel 
representing two classes of purchasers chose a damages measure for settlement purposes that 
favored one of them, finding that disfavored class members were unlikely to be successful on the 
merits on the other. Id. at 462–63. The court held: “[w]ere we to decertify the current class it is 
possible that no one will recover anything from Mego.” Id. at 463.  
260. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 628 (6th Cir. 2007). 
261. Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2012). 
262. Id. at 175. 
263. Id. at 185. 
264. Id. at 186. 
10 - Ratner.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2017  1:01 PM 
2017] CLASS CONFLICTS 839 
 
case bears some resemblance to Amchem and raises some of the same 
concerns.”265 Nevertheless, the court found that a mere misalignment of 
allocation preferences alone was not sufficiently fundamental to raise 
conflict concerns,
266
 especially where, as in Dewey, persons who had 
already experienced leaks were capable of experiencing future leaks, and 
where the settlement’s terms were “structured to ensure that even past 
claimants had an incentive to protect the rights of all members of the 
class to make future claims” by actually providing for payment of such 
claims.
267
 
Dewey objectors were more successful with regard to the second 
conflict they alleged, i.e., that between persons in a “reimbursement 
group” who had priority under the settlement and all other class 
members relegated to a “residual group” capable of making claims only 
if any portion of the $8 million fund remained.
268
 The boundaries of the 
residual group were determined by reference to the claims rate on a 
vehicle model.
269
 But the claims rate that distinguished those in the two 
groups was arbitrary, in that there was no justification for treating the 
two groups differently but for the class representatives’ desire to 
maximize the funds available to persons in the residual group.
270
 The 
Third Circuit found this conflict to be sufficiently fundamental to trigger 
adequacy of representation concerns.
271
 Why was this conflict different 
from the futures issue? The court found the degree of misalignment of 
interest here to be starker than with regard to the differential preferences 
of persons who had already experienced an injury and those who had 
not, because the reimbursement and residual plaintiffs’ preferences were 
relatively more oppositional.
272
 More to the point, the court found that 
the “structure of the settlement agreement itself,”273 which treated the 
groups differently for no apparent reason, was proof that the conflict was 
fundamental. That is, an unfair settlement term proved the existence of a 
                                                     
265. Id. at 185. 
266. Id. at 186 (“[E]ven if the representative plaintiffs did value protections for future claimants 
less than other members of the class, we do not believe that, again on this record, their differing 
valuations would create a fundamental conflict sufficient to undermine their ability to adequately 
represent the class.”). 
267. Id. 
268. Id. at 187. 
269. Id.  
270. Id. at 187–88. 
271. Id. at 187. 
272. Id. at 188 (“The problem is that the interests of the representative plaintiffs and the interests 
of the residual group aligned in opposing directions.”).  
273. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).  
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structural conflict. That is why the court posed as a solution either 
amendment of the settlement to eliminate the arbitrary distinction made 
between “reimbursement” and “residual” claimants or subclassing.274 
Dewey illustrates an intermediate appellate court not only giving 
Amchem a narrow read on the required degree of misalignment of 
interest, but flipping Amchem on its head
275
 by relying on an analysis of 
the fairness of the settlement’s terms to determine whether conflicts of 
interest are sufficiently fundamental to call the adequacy of 
representation into question. This reliance on the fairness of settlement 
terms to demonstrate the inadequacy of representation is evident even in 
the Second Circuit. In Payment Card Interchange, discussed above, the 
court went out of its way to demonstrate the relative stinginess of the 
relief accorded to (b)(2) settlement class members relative to (b)(3) 
settlement class members
276
 and to criticize the unfairly broad scope of 
the release made by (b)(2) members.
277
 
7. Deference to Trial Court Judges 
A last element of the attack on Amchem and Ortiz concerns the level 
of deference to the trial court judge deciding whether to subclass. 
Dissenting in Amchem, Justice Breyer wrote: “[w]hat constitutes 
adequate representation is a question of fact that depends on the 
circumstances of each case.”278 Dissenting in Ortiz, Justice Breyer again 
                                                     
274. Id. at 189; see also In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 307 (3d Cir. 2005) (looking to 
disparate and unfair settlement terms as a basis to find representation inadequate, in that case, 
because the class representatives did not have TILA or HOEPA claims and the settlement failed to 
provide any recovery for such claims). 
275. In Amchem, the Court acknowledged objections to the relatively sweeter deal received by 
class counsel’s inventory clients whose claims were settled outside the class action. Amchem 
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 606 (1997). But the intra-class conflict of interest on which 
the Court based its decision did not involve those non-class members. As to the core conflict 
between presently injured class members and those whose injuries had not yet manifested, the Court 
noted the existence of settlement terms that limited their recovery. Id. at 627 (“[N]o adjustment for 
inflation; only a few claimants per year can opt out at the back end; and loss-of-consortium claims 
are extinguished with no compensation.”). But the Court did not deem these provisions to be unfair. 
Instead, the Court found it notable that these terms “reflect essential allocation decisions designed to 
confine compensation and limit defendants’ liability.” Id. at 595. 
276. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 827 F.3d 223, 239 
(“This bargain is particularly unreasonable for merchants that begin accepting Visa or MasterCard 
after July 20, 2021.”). 
277. Id. (“Merchants that cannot surcharge (by reason of state law or rules of American Express) 
and those that begin operating after July 20, 2021 suffer an unreasonable tradeoff between relief and 
release that demonstrates their representation did not comply with due process.”). 
278. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 637 (quoting 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1765, at 271 (3d ed. 2007)). 
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emphasized the need to defer to trial courts’ assessments regarding the 
costs and benefits of subclassing, arguing that the trial court’s fact 
findings regarding the relative insignificance of the alleged allocation 
conflicts should not be overturned.
279
 The majority in each case 
obviously disagreed—not with the abuse of discretion standard, but with 
its application in each case. But intermediate appellate courts today 
borrow liberally from Breyer’s playbook. In In re Insurance Brokerage 
Antitrust Litigation,
280
 in a decision declining to disturb the trial court’s 
exercise of discretion not to require subclasses, the Third Circuit held: 
“[b]ecause ‘the decision whether to certify a subclass requires a 
balancing of costs and benefits that can best be performed by a district 
judge,’ we accord substantial deference to district courts with respect to 
their resolution of this issue.”281 Similarly, in both the BP and NFL 
cases, the intermediate appellate courts found the courts’ subclassing 
choices to be well within the trial court judges’ exercise of discretion.282 
D. The New Conflicts Management Regime 
The new conflicts management regime emerging from the trenches of 
lower federal courts is revealed in the two case studies sketched in the 
preceding sections. It is modest, rather than bold, in that, with few 
exceptions, it applies to a relatively limited universe of conflicts. It is 
regulatory, rather than market based, to the extent courts now rely on the 
judge’s ability to manage conflicts by supervising counsel directly or via 
neutrals. And it elevates utilitarian concerns over the intrinsic value of 
fair process to the extent it looks to the fairness of settlement outcomes 
to judge whether representation was adequate. In short, the conflicts 
management regime is the mirror image of the one built by the Supreme 
Court in Amchem and Ortiz. 
                                                     
279. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 87881 (1999). 
280. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 271 (3d Cir. 2009). 
281. Id. (quoting In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 202 (3d Cir. 2005)); see also Int’l 
Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 
F.3d 615, 629 (6th Cir. 2007) (“No doubt, the district courts could have drawn additional class lines, 
but they did not abuse their discretion in choosing not to do so.”).  
282. See In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d 410, 429 (3d Cir. 2016); In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 
790, 814 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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III. AN INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNT: THE MDL MODEL FOR 
MANAGING MASS TORTS AND THE INCONVENIENCE OF 
SUBCLASSING 
The preceding Part addressed how we got from Amchem to BP and 
the NFL class settlements. This Part explores why lower federal courts 
have effectively flipped the regulatory regime, providing an institutional 
account.
283
 As noted, at the time Amchem and Ortiz were decided, 
federal courts were jurisdictionally challenged with regard to mass tort 
class actions, and relatedly, the reverse auction was the most glaring 
ethical challenge of the day. Congress and courts responded with new 
formal and informal institutional arrangements for managing mass tort 
and other geographically dispersed class actions that together constitute 
the new “MDL model,”284 the general features of which are described 
below and were visible in both the BP and NFL case studies. This new 
model has had the effect of concentrating multijurisdictional class 
actions in federal courts; deferring class certification to later stages of 
proceedings, in mass torts mostly for settlement purposes; nudging 
federal courts to innovate new informal case management techniques 
that give them more control over case outcomes; substantially muting 
the reverse auction problem that concerned courts at the time Amchem 
and Ortiz were decided; and making settlement the only realistic 
endgame. 
The new MDL model for managing litigation of mass torts and other 
geographically dispersed harms was born of mistrust of class counsel,
285
 
but, for the reasons provided below, has had the effect of inspiring lower 
federal courts to trust them all the more at the time of settlement.
286
 The 
                                                     
283.  A competing account might involve the tension among different conceptual frames for 
addressing the “governance” problem posed by class actions. For a survey of “models of class 
action governance,” see Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 
37 IND. L. REV. 65, 92–115 (2003) (surveying “market,” “democracy-based,” and “judicial-
administrative” solutions to the class action governance problem). The virtue of an institutional 
account is that it explains why one conceptual framework would be more appealing to courts than 
another.  
284.  See supra note 12.  
285.  Erichson, supra note 60, at 1594–96.  
286.  Professor Marcus predicted that at least some plaintiffs and their counsel might actually end 
up looking favorably upon the jurisdictional regime CAFA wrought. See Richard L. Marcus, 
Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2008) (“By the 
1980s and 1990s, consternation about the 1966 expansion of class actions shifted markedly as 
defendants learned how to use class actions to accomplish the goals they wanted to achieve. So also, 
a quarter century from now, many may look back at CAFA as enabling legislation that furthered the 
goal of consumer class actions rather than the interests of the business establishment that pressed for 
its passage.”). 
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Amchem framework for regulating class conflicts now feels both less 
necessary and far less convenient, insofar as it fosters competition 
among subclass counsel in a system characterized by substantial court 
control aimed at facilitating cooperation among counsel and eventual 
global settlement. 
A. The MDL Model: New Formal and Informal Institutional 
Arrangements for Managing Mass Torts 
1. Formal: Early Concentration of Mass Torts in Federal Courts and 
Limits on Litigation Classes 
a. CAFA and 28 U.S.C. § 1407 
Parallel class proceedings in federal and state courts and concerns 
regarding outlier state court jurisdictions handling cases of national 
significance prompted calls for an exclusive forum model.
287
 In 2005, 
Congress responded with the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which 
modified the diversity statute in two ways that facilitate the 
concentration of mass tort litigation in federal court. First, in an effort to 
provide for federal court consideration of interstate cases of national 
importance, even if they involved state law claims,
288
 CAFA federalized 
much class action litigation. It did so by permitting aggregation of 
claims to meet the minimum amount in controversy requirement for 
cases involving more than $5 million and, in such cases, allowing 
removal to federal court on minimal rather than complete diversity.
289
 
CAFA has successfully shifted much class practice to federal court,
290
 
                                                     
287. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 517 (1996) 
(“[T]he move toward an exclusive [federal] forum model for large-scale cases is necessary and 
desirable.” (bracketed text added)); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor 
Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1416 (2006) (portraying CAFA as “a bulwark against 
improper or opportunistic state-court oversight of the national market”). 
288. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
289. “Minimal” diversity requires that any plaintiff and any defendant be citizens of different 
states. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A). 
290. Erichson, supra note 60, at 1607–14 (documenting the post-CAFA shift in class practice 
from state to federal court); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class 
Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1723, 1750–62 (2008) (noting a marked increase post-CAFA in the number of state-law 
cases filed in the first instance in federal court and in the number of diversity removals of class 
actions).  
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even if it leaves some multistate class actions in state court due to the 
home state and local controversy exceptions.
291
 
Second, CAFA expanded federal jurisdiction with regard to “mass 
actions.”292 A mass action includes any civil action other than a class 
action in which “monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are 
proposed to be tried jointly
293
 on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims 
involve common questions of law or fact.”294 Though the statutory 
regime does not federalize all mass tort claims,
295
 it has the effect of 
federalizing nearly all attempts to pursue such claims through trial en 
masse, whether via consolidated proceedings or class actions. 
Functionally, CAFA intersects with the MDL statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407, to not only federalize, but to also centralize mass tort litigation 
before a single trial court judge selected by the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation. The expansion of federal court subject matter 
jurisdiction coincides with what Professor Marcus characterizes as a 
“maximalist”296 use of the transfer and coordination statute. Because 
Section 1407 requires only “minimal commonality,”297 the Panel’s 
aggressive use of it results in the now-routine creation of sprawling 
super-aggregates that include not only large numbers of persons, but 
persons with varied claims and injuries. That maximalist approach, 
evident long before Congress enacted CAFA, has dramatically 
                                                     
291. The “local controversy” exception to CAFA applies when two-thirds of the plaintiffs and at 
least one defendant against whom “significant relief” is sought are citizens of the forum state, and 
certain other conditions are met. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A) (2012). The “home state” exception 
applies if two-thirds or more of the proposed class members and the primary defendants are citizens 
of the forum state. See id. § 1332(d)(4)(B). 
292. Id. § 1332(d). 
293. The intermediate appellate courts have split regarding the meaning of the phrase “proposed 
to be tried.” Compare In re Abbot Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2012) (joint trial 
proposal can be “implicit”), with Gutowski v. McKesson Corp., No. C 12-6056 CW, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 26333, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013) (casting doubt on the approach taken by the 
Seventh Circuit in Abbot and citing Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2009) for 
the proposition that CAFA’s mass action provisions should be read strictly and narrowly).  
294. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). CAFA’s effect on non-class mass torts is limited. For 
example, it does not include purely local matters or cases consolidated only for pretrial purposes. Id. 
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii). 
295. Mark S. Werner, The Viability and Strategic Significance of Class Action Alternatives Under 
CAFA’s Mass Action Provisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 465, 467 (2015) (noting that because the objective 
of mass tort litigation is normally settlement, not a joint trial, the omission of mass actions 
consolidated for pretrial purposes creates a potentially large loophole). 
296. Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use 
of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2266 (2008) (“[T]he 
operation of § 1407 has tended in a maximalist direction.”). 
297. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 667, 688 (2013).  
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intensified since that time, in terms of the number of MDL petitions 
granted each year and the size and scale of the largest of the MDLs.
298
 
This is especially true with regard to mass torts, which dominate the 
MDL docket in terms of the number of transferred cases, and 
particularly dominate the large-scale MDL docket.
299
 Whereas in 2002, 
MDL cases made up 16 percent of the federal caseload, they now make 
up 36 percent of the civil caseload, a number that grows to 45.6 percent 
of federal civil cases pending as of June 2014 if prisoner and social 
security cases are removed from the mix
300—and the vast majority of 
those are concentrated in a small number of giant MDL mass tort 
proceedings.
301
 
b. Limits on Mass Tort Litigation Classes; The Persistence of 
Settlement Classes 
Starting in the mid-1990s, courts and rule-makers placed new limits 
on the certification of litigation classes, especially with regard to mass 
torts.
302
 Two changes in particular are relevant to this analysis. First, 
rule-makers and courts effectively pushed back the certification 
determination to later stages of the procedural timeline by amending 
                                                     
298. See, e.g., John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
2225, 2230 (2008) (noting substantial growth post-CAFA in the number of MDL petitions and the 
total number of ongoing MDL dockets); Thomas Metzloff, The MDL Vortex Revisited, 99 
JUDICATURE 36, 42 (2015) (“In the last ten years, the concentration of the large MDL cases—
virtually all of the which are mass-tort cases—has risen exponentially.”); Standards and Best 
Practices for Large and Mass Tort MDLs, DUKE LAW CENTER FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES (Mar. 3, 
2016), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/standards_and_best_practices 
_for_large_and_mass-tort_mdls.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YJM-A2YD] [hereinafter DUKE STANDARDS 
AND BEST PRACTICES] (“Not only is the overall number of actions in MDLs growing, these actions 
are becoming more concentrated in a small number of mass-tort MDLs, primarily products liability 
and particularly pharmaceutical and health-care cases. Of the MDLs pending in June 2014, nearly 
88% of them were consolidated in only 18 MDLs—16 product liability and 2 other mass torts.”).  
299. See Metzloff, supra note 298, at 43 (“The reality with respect to mass-tort claims is radically 
different. The MDL process has come to be dominated by large mass-tort dockets typically 
involving thousands of underlying actions. Indeed, over 95 percent of the total actions currently 
consolidated through the MDL process are mass-tort cases. This represents a significant evolution in 
the utilization of the MDL process that initially took a restrictive approach to the mass-tort 
context.”).  
300. DUKE STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 298, at x–xi. 
301. See supra note 298. 
302. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION 95 (2015) (“Mass tort 
class actions quickly blossomed at the end of the 1980s and flourished until they were curtailed by 
the Supreme Court in the 1990s.”); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, Class Certification 
and Class Settlement: Findings from Federal Question Cases, 2003–2007, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 315, 
331 (2011) (“Since the 1990s, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended to make 
class certification more difficult.”).  
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Rule 23(c)(1)
303
 and by requiring the class certification determination to 
be based on a rigorous analysis of evidence, even if that evidence 
overlaps with the merits.
304
 Second, courts made it harder to certify 
litigation classes in mass torts, which frequently involve individual 
issues of causation and injury and varying state laws, by raising the bar 
on commonality under both 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3).
305
 
Though the class action’s death has been heralded in general and with 
regard to mass torts in particular,
306
 and though a significant theme in 
recent commentary is of a switch from class to administrative 
aggregation,
307
 mass tort settlement classes, the door to which Amchem 
left open,
308
 are still routinely even if less frequently
309
 embraced.
310
 
                                                     
303. Prior Rule 23 read that certification should be considered as “soon as practicable.” Pursuant 
to a 2003 amendment, Rule 23(c)(1)(A) now states that certification should be considered “[a]t an 
early practicable time.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
304. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351–52 (2011). 
305. See, e.g., id. at 349–50 (to satisfy 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement, plaintiffs must show 
that a common contention is “of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which 
means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of 
each one of the claims in one stroke”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–24 
(1997) (differences in exposure, causation, and state law undermined plaintiffs’ efforts to show 
predominance of common issues of fact or law). 
306. See supra note 13. 
307. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute 
Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 551 (2013) (“For those actors for whom the class action 
presents frustrating barriers to resolving massive litigation on favorable terms, there has been a 
decided shift away from the class action towards the creative invention of class-avoidance 
mechanisms.”); Sherman, The MDL Model, supra note 12, at 2223 (describing the MDL “model” as 
an “alternative” to class actions); Willging & Lee III, supra note 12, at 777 (“This Article examines 
the extent to which available empirical research supports the impressions of scholars that a shift has 
occurred from using class action procedures to using multidistrict-litigation procedures to manage 
and resolve tort litigation in the federal courts.”). 
308. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 619 (“[S]ettlement is relevant to a class certification.”); 
see also Alexandra D. Lahav, Symmetry and Class Action Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1494, 1507 
(2013) (“The recent renaissance in settlement classes allows defendants to obtain global peace when 
they agree to a settlement price, but they can resist collective resolution in all other cases so that 
litigation is extremely costly for plaintiffs to pursue.”). 
309. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee 
Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 819 (2010) (finding almost no mass tort settlements in 
federal court in the period 2006–07); Willging & Lee III, supra note 302, at 341 (noticing fewer 
mass tort class actions in federal courts, overall, compared to the 1990s). 
310. See, e.g., In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 2:07-MD-1873, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146680 (E.D. La. Sept. 27, 2012) (resolving product liability claims in an MDL 
via settlement on a class basis); Klein v. O’Neal, 705 F. Supp. 2d 632 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (certifying 
settlement class in personal injury drug case); In re Serzone Prods. Liab. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 221 
(S.D. W. Va. 2005) (certifying settlement class involving allegedly defective drug that caused 
personal injuries); In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 359 (N.D. Ohio 2001) 
(certifying settlement of medical device products liability settlement class); Brown v. Am. Home 
Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine)) Prods. Liab. Litig., 
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When these class settlements take place within liberally constituted 
administrative aggregates, as happened in the BP and NFL case studies, 
the result is settlement classes that can be as sprawling as the asbestos 
class the Supreme Court found objectionable in Amchem. 
2. Informal: Trial Judges Organize Plaintiffs’ Counsel and Tightly 
Control Pretrial Activity 
The formal moves just described enabled informal arrangements that 
have resulted in an unprecedented level of judicial control that MDL 
judges now enjoy over mass tort proceedings. Not only have judges 
selectively imported class action management procedures into 
multidistrict litigation proceedings relating to the appointment and 
payment of counsel,
311
 but they have also innovated new ways to control 
every other phase, including pleading, discovery, settlement negotiation, 
and bellwether trials. 
One of the first items of business for the MDL judge after transfer and 
coordination is the conferral of an exclusive right to manage “common 
benefit work”312 on a subset of plaintiffs’ counsel (“common benefit 
counsel”).313 In large mass torts, this involves two steps: the appointment 
and organization of common benefit counsel
314
 and the enumeration of 
their spheres of responsibility and authority, and entry of case 
                                                     
No. 99-20593, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275, at *24 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (certifying settlement 
class in personal injury drug case in consolidated proceeding involving 176 cases and 8 million 
people). See generally Sullivan v. DB Invs., 667 F.3d 273, 334 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., 
concurring) (“Despite initial uncertainty the opinions might pose formidable obstacles for settling 
massive, complex cases, this has not, for the most part, proved to be the case. Nonetheless, class 
settlement in mass tort cases (especially personal injury claims) remains problematic, leading some 
practitioners to avoid the class action device—most prominently in the recent $4.85 billion mass 
settlement of 50,000 claims arising out of the use of the drug Vioxx.”). 
311. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2009). 
312. Silver & Miller, supra note 12, at 143 (common benefit work includes “all litigation-related 
services displaying a property known as jointness: when produced or performed once, many 
plaintiffs can use such services without reducing their value for any other plaintiff”).  
313. See generally DUKE STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 298, at 42 (“MDL 
Standard 3: [t]he transferee judge should select lead counsel, liaison counsel, and committee 
members as soon as practicable after the JPML transfers the litigation.”); MANUAL, supra note 1, 
§§ 10.221–.224 (describing trial court’s role in organization plaintiffs’ counsel in multiparty 
litigation). 
314. Common benefit counsel typically include some combination of: (1) liaison counsel; (2) lead 
counsel; and (3) executive and/or steering committees, along with sub-committees created to 
address specific issues (e.g., expert discovery). The size and complexity of the common benefit 
counsel arrangements depend on the size of the case. See DUKE STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, 
supra note 298, at 40–41. 
10 - Ratner.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2017  1:01 PM 
848 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:785 
 
management orders ensuring payment for common benefit work out of 
individual recoveries.
315
 
Also in the early stages of mass tort proceedings, before any 
settlement is negotiated, MDL trial courts enter orders assuring payment 
for common benefit work via assessments on MDL plaintiff recoveries 
by trial or settlement directed to be paid into a common benefit fund to 
be used to spread the costs of common benefit work across all plaintiffs 
who benefit from it.
316
 An example is the order arranging payment and 
reimbursement of costs for common benefit counsel in the Stryker 
Rejuvenate and ABGII hip implant products liability MDL.
317
 The 
order—levying a three percent holdback on all plaintiffs for common 
benefit fees and one percent for common costs
318—applies to all cases 
included in the MDL as well as “all cases or claims (filed or unfiled) of 
all Participating Counsel . . . and all cases or claims (filed or unfiled) in 
state or federal court where the Participating Counsel has a fee 
                                                     
315. Professors Silver and Miller refer to these moves (along with fee transfers from and caps on 
non-lead counsel) as the key components of the “quasi-class action approach to MDL 
management.” Silver & Miller, supra note 12, at 110–11. This Article recognizes these 
arrangements as central to all mass tort practice, including class actions, and views them through the 
lens of efforts to inspire cooperation among counsel.  
316. Federal courts claim the inherent authority to enter such orders. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 582 F.3d 524, 546–47 (3d Cir. 2009); In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades 
on December 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1977). See generally Eldon E. Fallon, 
Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 371, 379 (2014) (“Regardless of 
the legal basis given to explain its use, the common benefit doctrine has been consistently used and 
is well established as the justification for the payment of common benefit fees in MDLs.”). MDL 
trial court judges have extended the contribution requirements to state court litigants via orders 
aimed at the defendants over whom they have jurisdiction. See, e.g., Amended Holdback Order Re: 
Common Benefit Fees and Costs at 3, In re Biomet M2A Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 
No. 3:12-md-2391 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 2015), ECF No. 3022 (establishing a six percent common 
benefit “holdback,” and noting with regard to “plaintiffs’ attorneys litigating Biomet Hip Implant 
cases in state courts, the Amended Holdback Order will apply if the respective state court litigant 
and counsel sought the benefit of the work product of PSC II.”). See generally DUKE STANDARDS 
AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 298, at 73–74. 
317. See Order Establishing Common Benefit Fee and Expense Fund, In re Stryker Rejuvenate & 
ABG II Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 13-2441 (D. Minn. May 28, 2014), ECF No. 327. 
Similar orders have been entered in other recent MDLs. See, e.g., Order No. 42 [Establishing 
Common Benefit Fee and Expense Fund] at 15–19, In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 
No. 1:14-md-02543 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015), ECF No. 743; Case Management Order No. 16 
(Establishing Common Benefit Fee and Expense Fund) at 4–6, In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02385 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2012), ECF No. 61.  
318. Order Establishing Common Benefit Fee and Expense Fund at 6, In re Stryker Rejuvenate & 
ABG II Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 13-2441 (D. Minn. May 28, 2014), ECF No. 327. 
Counsel outside the MDL who agree to be bound by the order, e.g., in recognition of their use of 
MDL work product, must pay a higher holdback amount for common benefit fees of five percent 
ninety days after their first filed case is docketed in any jurisdiction.  
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interest.”319 The term “Participating Counsel” is defined as “any lawyer 
(and his or her law firm) who represents a client with a case on file in the 
MDL now or in the future, or any other lawyer (and his or her law firm) 
who signs the Participation Agreement or uses the work product of the 
MDL.”320 This innovation with regard to securing common benefit fees 
is a marked departure from past practice. 
a. Common Benefit Counsel Selection Criteria 
Whereas adequate representation in class actions turns to a great 
extent on an analysis of conflicts, in MDLs it does not. With the deferral 
of class certification to much later stages of proceedings, the law of 
administrative,
321
 not class, aggregation provides the animating 
principles for organizing counsel in mass torts. Judges appointing MDL 
leadership at the outset of such proceedings, unconstrained by rule or 
statute, typically identify by modern convention three characteristics as 
paramount: experience, financial capacity, and cooperativeness.
322
 
Cooperativeness as a trait is normally not defined, but presumably 
implies the ability to minimize and settle disputes with other plaintiffs’ 
counsel and defendants. In addition, the trend is toward appointment of 
steering committees that are broadly inclusive and representative. 
                                                     
319. Id. at 2. 
320. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). The extent of the federal MDL court’s ability to levy such 
assessments is the subject of litigation and has not been definitively resolved by the Supreme Court, 
which just passed up an opportunity to enter the fray. See Phipps Grp. v. Downing (In re 
Genetically Modified Rice Litig.), 764 F.3d 864, 864 (8th Cir. 2014) (affirming trial court’s levy 
against payments to non-MDL participants who enrolled in the settlement and thereby agreed to pay 
common fund assessments), cert. denied, Phipps Grp. v. Downing, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1455 
(2015).  
321. The “law of administrative aggregation” includes 28 U.S.C. § 1407, FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a), 
case law interpreting them, the orders of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, and, most 
importantly, the orders of trial courts managing administratively aggregated matters, including the 
orders appointing counsel to leadership roles in such cases.  
322. Courts identify these traits in the orders they enter soliciting applications for leadership 
roles. See, e.g., Pretrial Order #1 at 9, In re Bos. Sci. Corp., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., 
MDL No. 2326 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 29, 2012) [hereinafter In re Bos. Sci.] (“The main criteria for 
PSC membership will be: (a) willingness and availability to commit to a time-consuming project; 
(b) ability to work cooperatively with others; and (c) professional experience in this type of 
litigation”), http://www.wvsd.uscourts.gov/MDL/boston/pdfs/PTO_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SM6-
WZQN]; Initial Conference Order at 6, In re Yasmin and YAZ (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales 
Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2009), ECF No. 83 
[hereinafter In re Yasmin] (“The Court intends to appoint Plaintiffs’ lead counsel and/or a 
Plaintiffs’ steering committee, as well as Plaintiffs’ liaison counsel. . . . The main criteria for these 
appointments are (1) willingness and ability to commit to a time-consuming process; (2) ability to 
work cooperatively with others; (3) professional experience in this type of litigation; and (4) access 
to sufficient resources to advance the litigation in a timely manner.”).  
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Cooperativeness as a selection criterion is particularly heavily 
emphasized.
323
 The repeat player phenomenon documented by 
Professors Burch and Williams
324
 reinforces the judges’ ability to select 
for that characteristic, based on their direct experience, a review of the 
applicants’ settlement records, and/or on conversations judges 
informally have with each other. An example of this is the recent VW 
emissions litigation, where, when appointing repeat player and leading 
member of the plaintiffs’ mass tort bar Elizabeth Cabraser325 as lead 
counsel, Judge Breyer specifically noted her support among fellow 
plaintiffs’ counsel and his familiarity with and admiration of her work in 
a prior case, which suggested to him that “Ms. Cabraser will effectively 
represent and guide the plaintiffs toward a resolution that is in their best 
interests.”326 This suggests that persons selected are likely to fit the 
desired profile, and that persons, once selected, are likely to adhere to 
that profile in order to be eligible for leadership roles in future cases, 
either as court appointees or as members of sub-committees. 
                                                     
323. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict 
Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2724637 [https://perma.cc/MF95-3728]; Burch, supra note 
15, at 73, 86; Stanwood R. Duval, Jr., Considerations in Choosing Counsel for Multidistrict 
Litigation Cases and Mass Tort Cases, 74 LA. L. REV. 391, 392 (2014). This selection criterion 
arguably amplifies the cooperation that litigation by committee naturally inspires. See, e.g., Dando 
B. Cellini, An Overview of Antitrust Class Actions, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1501, 1505 (1980) 
(describing litigation by “committee” as inspiring a certain level of cooperation: “[a] good trial 
lawyer’s tenacious pursuit of his own theory of the case and his unwillingness to compromise his 
own client’s interests in the slightest respect for the good of the majority are almost immediately 
taken as signs of pigheadedness on the part of this fellow counsel. The result is that he is quickly 
ostracized from the decision-making inner circle of lawyers on his side of the case”).  
324. Burch & Williams, supra note 323, at 21 (“On the plaintiffs’ side, repeat players . . . held 
767 out of 1,221 available leadership roles, or 62.8 percent. Fifty attorneys were named as lead 
lawyers in five or more multidistrict litigations and those 50 attorneys occupied 30 percent of all 
plaintiff-side leadership positions. . . . Repeat play among plaintiffs’ law firms was even more 
evident. Again, even though only 40.7 percent of law firms were repeat players . . . lawyers from 
those 70 firms occupied 78 percent of all available leadership positions.”). Professors Burch’s and 
Williams’ study confirms what others predicted in the period just before and after the enactment of 
CAFA, i.e., that it would privilege a select group of large national plaintiffs’ firms and concentrate 
them in federal court MDL proceedings. See Erichson, supra note 60, at 1621 (noting that CAFA 
favors the nation’s largest class action firms (citing Deborah Hensler as quoted in Michael Bobelian, 
Congress Eyes Major Class Action Reforms, N.J. L.J. at 9 (Jan. 12, 2004))). 
325. See Elizabeth J. Carabraser, LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMMAN & BERNSTEIN, http:// 
www.lieffcabraser.com/Attorneys/Elizabeth-J-Cabraser.shtml [https://perma.cc/DX54-CV6Z]. 
326. See Pretrial Order No. 7: Order Appointing Plaintiffs’ Lead Counsel, Plaintiffs’ Steering 
Committee, and Government Coordinating Counsel at 1–2, In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” 
Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:15-md-02672 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2016), ECF 
No. 1084.  
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The move toward inclusive leadership committees is of yet more 
recent vintage and gaining traction.
327
 It has two components. One is 
diversity of membership in terms of the members’ personal 
characteristics, such as gender.
328
 The second is inclusiveness in terms of 
ensuring that the PSC represents the broadest possible swath of 
claimants or claims.
329
 It is the latter meaning that is of greatest 
relevance to this analysis because it dovetails with changed judicial 
attitudes towards conflicts management and foreshadows one of the 
substitutes for incentive-based structural assurances of fairness. This 
desire for inclusiveness in leadership structures explains in part what 
appear at first blush to be unwieldly and large steering committees. The 
VW emissions MDL again serves as an example. Judge Breyer 
appointed one lawyer as MDL lead plaintiffs’ counsel, and proceeded to 
appoint twenty additional lawyers from twenty other law firms to the 
steering committee.
330
 The number of common benefit counsel 
appointed in that proceeding is due in part to its complexity and in part 
to plaintiffs’ litigation funding needs. But it is also about creating the 
kind of buy-in by key counsel to the aggregate settlement process that, 
as explained below, is at odds with conflicts management approaches 
that rely on competition or adversarialism among plaintiffs’ counsel 
representing warring camps. 
Judges could consider the impact on conflicts as a criterion when 
selecting common benefit counsel at the front end of mass tort 
proceedings, a necessary first step for managing conflicts via market 
mechanisms. But, as noted, nothing in the text of the MDL statute 
requires courts to do so.
331
 Rule 23(g)(3) is a bridge between, on the one 
                                                     
327. DUKE STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 298, at 46. 
328. See DUKE STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 298, at 46–47, 58. U.S. District 
Judge Kathryn Vratil of Kansas recently received attention for appointing the first majority-female 
plaintiffs’ steering committee in an MDL that includes a majority of women, the MDL involving 
Ethicon, Inc.’s power morcellators, devices used in laparoscopic uterine surgeries, which are alleged 
to cause cancer. See In re Ethicon, Power Morcellator Prods. Liab. Litig., No.2:15-md-02652 (D. 
Kan. Nov. 19, 2015), ECF No. 10; Amanda Bronstad, In a First, Women Compose Majority of MDL 
Committee, NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202742961283/In-
a-First-Women-Compose-Majority-of-MDL-Committee?slreturn=20160205180140 [https://perma. 
cc/5G8S-ULUX] (touting the gender diversity reflected in the order as a positive development). But 
see Jaime Dodge, Facilitative Judging: Organizational Design in Mass-Multidistrict Litigation, 64 
EMORY L.J. 329, 363–65 (2014) (presenting data regarding the lack of demographic diversity on 
MDL committees, especially regarding gender).  
329. See DUKE STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 298, at 57 (“Best Practice 4D(iii): 
[t]he transferee judge should consider the number, type, and nature of the applicant’s cases in mass 
tort and common disaster litigation.”). 
330. Pretrial Order No. 7, supra note 326, at 3–4. 
331. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).  
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hand, 28 U.S.C. § 1407’s relatively open-ended and lax appointment 
standards, and, on the other, Rule 23’s relatively more specific, stringent 
standards. That subsection of Rule 23, added by rule amendment in 
2003, permits trial courts to “designate interim counsel to act on behalf 
of a putative class before determining whether to certify the action as a 
class action.”332 Courts exercising their discretion to appoint interim 
class counsel are required to apply the same criteria they would use 
when appointing class counsel on a motion for class certification, 
assessing adequacy of representation by attempting to uncover and 
address conflicts of interest.
333
 But the existence of a doctrinal vehicle 
for assessing conflicts at the front end of MDL proceedings has proved 
to be of limited utility without a requirement that courts use it. 
The trial courts in both the BP and NFL litigations followed the MDL 
model, appointing common benefit counsel early in the proceedings 
without contemporaneously appointing interim class counsel or 
otherwise using the standards of Rule 23(g) to guide the choice of 
counsel. 
b. Judicial Control over Pleading, Discovery, Trial, and Settlement 
Discussions 
Professor Richard Marcus has characterized the rules of civil 
procedure as providing for a level of “adult supervision” by the judge in 
civil litigation.
334
 Modern mass tort practice goes further, in some 
instances taking the parties out of the process altogether, creating a 
degree of cooperation by fiat at all stages of the litigation, including 
pleading, discovery, and bellwether trials. Courts are also regularly 
involved, directly or through appointed neutrals, in settlement 
negotiations. 
By way of example, courts managing mass tort proceedings now 
coordinate pleading practice by entering case management orders that 
call for form pleadings, sometimes bundling those pleadings to funnel 
                                                     
332. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(3). 
333. See, e.g., In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 240 F.R.D. 56, 57 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) (“Although neither the federal rules nor the advisory committee notes expressly so state, it 
appears to be generally accepted that the considerations set out in Rule 23(g)(1)(C), which governs 
the appointment of class counsel once a class is certified, apply equally to the designation of interim 
class counsel before certification.”). 
334. Richard Marcus, Cooperation and Litigation: Thoughts on the American Experience, 61 
KAN. L. REV. 821, 842–43, 846 (2013) (sampling rules that “urge or require behavior that could be 
called cooperative”). 
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motion practice as Judge Barbier did in the BP litigation.
335
 The order 
entered in the Stryker hip implant MDL is representative.
336
 It requires 
common benefit counsel to “develop Master Long and Short-Form 
Complaints that set forth all potential claims that individual plaintiffs 
may assert against Defendants in this MDL” and which “supersede and 
replace all claims pled in any previously filed Complaint.”337 
In discovery, mass tort judges may substitute their own agendas, and 
even specific requests, for those of the parties. An example is the core 
discovery order in the World Trade Center first responder litigation that 
involved approximately 10,000 personal injury claims consolidated for 
pretrial purposes under Rule 42 before Judge Hellerstein in the Southern 
District of New York.
338
 Noting that the parties, left to their own 
devices, had failed to make progress in discovery, Judge Hellerstein 
appointed two special masters to (1) write discovery and (2) prepare a 
database for converting it into useful information, and ordered the 
parties to respond.
339
 The judge later attributed successful resolution of 
the matter in large part to this usurpation of litigant autonomy.
340
 While 
Hellerstein’s decision to entirely circumvent the parties is unusual, 
substantial judicial control over the sequence, timing, and content of 
discovery in modern mass tort practice is not.
341
 
Judge Hellerstein’s control of discovery was also partly aimed at 
building the basis for bellwether trials.
342
 While courts’ approaches to 
structuring bellwether trials vary, the scheduling of such trials is a 
                                                     
335. In the BP oil spill MDL, Judge Barbier required the filing of master complaints in “pleading 
bundles,” corresponding to major categories of claims, such as economic loss and personal injury. 
See Pretrial Order No. 11 [Case Management Order No. 1] at 2–7, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-
02179 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2010), ECF No. 569. 
336. See Pretrial Order No. 6, In re Stryker Rejuvenate & ABG II Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 
No. 13-2441 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2013), ECF No. 119; see also Pretrial Order #12 (Master and Short 
Form Complaint and Master Responsive Pleadings; Direct Filing), In re Bos. Sci. Corp., Pelvic 
Repair Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 2326 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.wvsd.uscourts. 
gov/MDL/boston/pdfs/PTO_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVZ8-YJME]. 
337. Pretrial Order No. 6, supra note 336, at 7. 
338. See generally Alvin K. Hellerstein, James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, 
Managerial Judging: The 9/11 Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127, 177 (2012).  
339. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 501, 523–24 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009); Clarifying Order Regulating Discovery at 2–4, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 
No. 1:21-mc-00100 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007), ECF No. 619. 
340. Hellerstein et al., supra note 338, at 142–44. 
341. See, e.g., Plaintiff Fact Sheet, In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 
3:12-MD-02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2012), ECF No. 54-1 (form discovery). 
342. Hellerstein et al., supra note 338, at 144–52. 
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routine part of mass tort case management.
343
 Bellwether trial outcomes 
are not binding on members of the aggregate, but nevertheless may 
impact them by shaping the allocation of common benefit resources and 
settlement efforts. The mechanism for selecting bellwethers, often in the 
early phases of proceedings, has the effect of narrowing the road toward 
specific categories of claims and issues that are thought to be important 
and representative.
344
 Judicial management of discovery and the 
bellwether process in turn facilitates settlement discussions,
345
 which 
MDL trial court judges aggressively promote
346
 and either directly or 
indirectly monitor. 
It’s the one-two punch of concentration of authority in cooperative 
common benefit counsel whom the judges then micro-manage that has 
put judges, not counsel, at the center of mass torts, and has limited some 
of the worst excesses that plagued the institutional arrangements in place 
at the time the Court decided Amchem and Ortiz. As the following 
section explains, there are still spaces for disputes and competition 
among plaintiffs’ counsel, and of course between the parties, but they 
are constrained by the bureaucratizing, standardizing, and prioritizing 
that characterize modern mass tort case management. 
B. The Faded Threat of Reverse Auctions 
The likelihood of reverse auctions in mass torts has been substantially 
reduced as a result of the new institutional arrangements described in the 
                                                     
343. See generally Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials 
in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2358 (2008). 
344. See Amended Case Management Order No. 24 Bellwether Trial Selection Plan at 5, In re 
Yasmin and YAZ (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-
DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2010), ECF No. 1329 (“Most modern plans seem to disfavor random 
selection in order to have better control over the representative characteristics of the cases selected” 
for bellwether trials); MANUAL, supra note 1, § 22.315 (selected “plaintiffs and their claims should 
be representative of the range of cases”).  
345. BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & CATHERINE R. BORDEN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANAGING 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES 44 (2011) (discussing usefulness of 
bellwether trials in establishing claim values to be used for settlement purposes). 
346. Judicial involvement in settlement is heightened in MDL practice in general and mass tort 
litigation in particular. Id. at 4 (“One of the values of MDL proceedings is that they bring before a 
single judge all of the federal cases, parties, and counsel making up the litigation. They therefore 
afford a unique opportunity for negotiation of a global settlement.”). For example, in the Pradaxa 
litigation, the court ordered the parties to confer about settlement at least once per month and to 
include a court appointed mediator in discussions. See Case Management Order No. 6 Unified Case 
Management Plan at 6–8, In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-
02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2012), ECF No. 42; Case Management Order No. 39 
Appointing Mediator at 1–2, In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-
02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. July 15, 2013), ECF No. 233. 
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preceding section. Plaintiffs’ counsel are now concentrated in a single 
federal court proceeding,
347
 arranged into broadly representative and 
inclusive leadership committees, and are guaranteed payment for 
common benefit work if plaintiffs—any plaintiffs—win a judgment or 
settlement. Courts insist on substantial case development before even 
considering class certification and cabin adversarialism among 
plaintiffs’ counsel by tightly controlling all phases of litigation and 
settlement. Plaintiffs’ counsel thus lack the incentive (role-insecurity) 
and the ability (early certification by inexperienced and isolated trial 
court judges) to race against each other to a class judgment. 
At least two spaces still exist in which plaintiffs’ counsel can 
conceivably engage in behaviors associated with reverse auctions. First, 
though the likelihood of a state court resolution is now low, it is not 
eliminated. Some state court actions within a category of mass tort 
litigation may still evade federal court litigation, because, among other 
reasons, they involve non-diverse parties and are not class or mass 
actions, or otherwise fall within one of CAFA’s exceptions. The 
centrality of MDL proceedings and more active coordination between 
federal and state courts make it unlikely that defendants would now 
choose a state forum for a global resolution, especially given the red 
flags doing so would raise. But the state court is still formally 
available.
348
 
Second, within a PSC, members may attempt to gain position with 
defendants and thus status and control over settlement by adopting less 
adversarial postures than their peers. This dynamic can occur any time 
more than one lawyer is given responsibility for engaging in settlement 
discussions with defendants, even in a consolidated proceeding where 
the court grants exclusive power to such lawyers to negotiate. This is so 
because even though payment for common benefit work is assured in 
successful mass torts, lawyers will still compete for the ability to justify 
a relatively larger share of any common fees awarded by the court post-
settlement. An example is Holocaust-era litigation against Swiss banks, 
in connection with which multiple cases were consolidated under Rule 
42 before Judge Edward R. Korman in the Southern District of New 
York.
349
 The judge appointed an Executive Committee of plaintiffs’ 
                                                     
347. See Erichson, supra note 45, at 961 (noting that the combination of CAFA and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407 “reduce the likelihood of competing class actions in multiple courts”). 
348. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996). 
349. The district court established a website that provides a chronology of proceedings. 
Chronology: In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, SWISS BANKS SETTLEMENT (Nov. 22, 2016), 
http://www.swissbankclaims.com/Chronology.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZSH3-A9Z7]; see also Morris 
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counsel to oversee the litigation and settlement discussions.
350
 Those 
lawyers competed with each other for position. When settlement talks 
stalled because of the gap between the parties over settlement amount, 
one subset of plaintiffs’ counsel unilaterally held a press conference to 
announce a willingness to settle for amounts well below the $1.5 billion 
figure other members of the Executive Committee had declared as a line 
in the sand.
351
 The gambit failed in that one instance, where the $1.5 
billion floor had widespread support among not only plaintiffs’ counsel 
but also victim advocate groups and state and federal political figures 
who were closely watching the proceedings.
352
 It likely also failed 
because there was no alternative forum in which to effectuate a 
settlement below that which the majority of court-appointed plaintiffs’ 
counsel was willing to accept. 
Current mass tort institutional arrangements limit such behavior. 
MDL trial courts frequently appoint only one or two lead counsel, whom 
they select for their cooperative tendencies. Trial court judges or their 
appointed neutrals are frequently at the center of settlement discussions, 
which has the effect of anchoring discussions and making fragmentation 
of plaintiffs’ counsel even less likely. Finally, as a matter of course, 
MDL courts now frequently ask committees of counsel who played key 
roles in the proceedings to render opinions for the court regarding the 
extent to which other applicants for common benefit fees contributed 
positively to the outcome;
353
 counsel who might otherwise be tempted to 
win by losing know the likelihood of exposure is high. 
As demonstrated in the following section, the very institutional 
arrangements that have allowed federal courts to substantially control for 
the worst of the conflicts problems of the pre-MDL-model, pre-CAFA 
era make those same courts all-the-more resistant to Amchem’s conflicts 
management formula. 
                                                     
A. Ratner, The Settlement of Nazi-Era Litigation Through the Executive and Judicial Branches, 20 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 212, 212 n.1 (2002). 
350.  Ratner, supra note 349, at 214. 
351. See JOHN AUTHERS & RICHARD WOLFFE, THE VICTIM’S FORTUNE: INSIDE THE EPIC BATTLE 
OVER THE DEBTS OF THE HOLOCAUST 93 (2002) (“On July 15, [Robert] Swift announced, with Ed 
Fagan, that they were prepared to ‘come off the $1.5 billion figure’ named by Weiss, provided the 
Swiss banks would increase their offer. Neither of them bothered to inform in advance the other 
eight members of the committee running the lawsuit.”).  
352. Ratner, supra note 349, at 214. 
353. For example, in the BP litigation, Judge Barbier appointed a subset of the PSC to serve on a 
fee committee to review fee applications in that litigation. See Pretrial Order No. 59 (Appointment 
of Common Benefit Fee and Cost Committee and Guidelines for Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fees 
and Cost Reimbursement) [“Initial Fee Order”], In re Oil Spill, No. 12-970 (E.D. La. July 15, 
2015), ECF No. 14863. 
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C. Institutional Dissonance: Why Amchem’s Conflicts Management 
Blueprint Is Unappealing to Lower Federal Courts 
Even in the period immediately after Amchem was decided, some trial 
court judges chafed at its dictates. Writing at the turn of the century, 
Professor Resnik observed: 
[C]lass actions still have their champions in state and federal 
courts. Many trial judges, less buffered from needy litigants than 
appellate judges, are acutely aware of injuries suffered by 
groups of plaintiffs, of the lack of congressional responses to 
date, of inequitable distribution patterns generated by case-by-
case decision making, and of the inability of courts to render 
enough of those case-by-case decisions. Such judges continue to 
certify classes and help to craft settlements for some of them.
354
 
Those impulses have magnified as lower courts have evolved new 
techniques for managing large-scale litigation described in the preceding 
section. Not only are the worst problems associated with late twentieth 
century mass tort practice now largely muted, but the aims and 
institutional structure of modern mass tort practice are inconsistent with 
Amchem’s framework for managing conflicts. 
1. Judicial Confidence 
Amchem’s agency cost framework relies on subclassing to harness 
counsel’s fee-maximizing impulses in support of the interests of 
properly defined subclasses. This incentive-based approach may seem 
crude and limited, in that it accomplishes that interest alignment only as 
to that limited category of conflicts that result in subclassing and 
assumes that subclass counsel have sufficient leverage to advance 
subclass member interests.
355
 But in the mass tort litigation landscape the 
Supreme Court surveyed in the late 1990s, it was attractive. Judges 
lacked sufficient control over proceedings due to jurisdictional 
limitations, and it was commonly perceived that they lacked sufficient 
knowledge of the claims and issues to effectively police for fairness 
based on the settlement terms, especially when settlements were 
presented.
356
 The MDL trial court judges who oversee mass tort practice 
                                                     
354. Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and 
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2157 
(2000) (citing, among other cases, In re Austrian & German Holocaust Bank Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 
164, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (approving a class settlement of Holocaust-era claims)). 
355. See NAGAREDA, supra note 225, at 229 (teasing out the leverage problem). 
356. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 16, at 1348 (“[C]ourts have little ability or incentive to resist 
the settlements that the parties in class action litigation reach.”); Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the 
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today are differently situated. They typically are the center of gravity, 
even if some cases still escape the MDL vortex; exercise tremendous 
control over counsel and the proceedings, and are thus capable of 
assuring proper case development via discovery and establishment of 
bellwether trials; intervene and actively shape settlement discussions via 
direct involvement or the appointment of neutrals; and, in short, can be 
far more confident than could trial courts in earlier eras that the 
outcomes they produce bear a reasonable relationship to merits. 
That confidence is reflected in the language used by Judges Barbier 
and Brody in their orders approving the BP and NFL settlements. Faced 
with objections regarding conflicts and challenges to the merits of the 
various settlements in both proceedings, the judges pointed to their own 
involvement, the involvement of the neutrals they appointed to oversee 
negotiations, and to the relationship between settlement payments and 
claim value as proof that they were able to capably manage the 
proceedings to a fair outcome.
357
 That may read to some as a familiar 
expression of trial court hubris that predates the modern era. But these 
judges now have the institutional arrangements in place to justify it. 
Judicial self-confidence partly explains the shift from market- or 
incentive-based conflicts management to a regulatory approach that 
depends on involved judges to steer litigation to fair outcomes. It also 
explains in part the resurgence of utilitarianism, where fair settlement 
terms suggest adequate and sufficiently conflict-free representation. 
2. The Settlement Endgame 
Confident federal trial court judges can still subclass. One major 
reason they do not do so with the frequency or in the manner Amchem 
and Ortiz imagined is captured in the Balkanization metaphor dissected 
above, i.e., the fear that the competition among plaintiffs’ counsel 
subclassing naturally generates will make it harder to achieve the goal of 
the MDL model of litigating mass torts. A successful MDL judge is one 
who resolves the litigation, and the only way to do that short of 
knocking the cases out on a common issue, e.g., upon a motion to 
dismiss or summary judgment on a question of law or fact that is 
common to all coordinated actions, is via settlement.
358
 The desire for 
                                                     
Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 206 (2001) (judges’ lack of resources and expertise can make it challenging 
for them to perform their role as fiduciaries for the class). 
357. See supra notes 24849 and accompanying text.  
358. See Burch, supra note 15, at 73 (noting that MDL judges use “innovative procedures to 
usher these cases toward settlement”); id. at 76 (noting “institutional pressure” toward settlement of 
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global resolution drives all facets of MDL management, because, per the 
MDL statute
359
 and Lexecon,
360
 cases not resolved in pretrial 
proceedings must, absent settlement, be sent back to their transferor 
courts. That rarely happens.
361
 Instead, ninety-six percent of actions 
consolidated in MDLs terminate before trial, and anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the “large majority” of such resolutions are via 
settlement.
362
 
3. Timing Is Everything 
Settlement in the MDL model for processing mass tort claims occurs 
in one of two primary modes: contract or class. An example of an 
aggregate settlement achieved via contract is the Vioxx litigation, 
resolved pursuant to an agreement between defendant Merck and 
plaintiffs’ counsel.363 The BP and NFL case studies are examples of 
class settlements, where only the representative plaintiffs and their 
counsel sign an agreement that results in a binding judgment upon those 
absent class members who do not opt out after receiving notice of its 
terms. The mode to be adopted is normally not known at the outset, 
when common benefit counsel are appointed as part of plaintiffs’ 
steering committees in the MDL. Instead, the settling parties in their 
discretion elect the form of aggregation at the back end of proceedings 
when they are negotiating settlement terms. Because no one seriously 
expects certification of a litigation class in most mass torts,
364
 Rule 23 
and its requirement of adequate representation need not be confronted 
unless and until the parties make the choice to settle on a class basis. 
                                                     
MDLs); Silver & Miller, supra note 12, at 114 (noting that one of the purposes of the MDL statute 
was to promote global settlements). But see Dodge, supra note 328, at 333 (“Modern MDL judges 
no longer press settlement at all costs but instead embrace a wider variety of outcomes as successful 
resolutions.”). See also Issacharoff, supra note 63, at 829 (overworked federal trial court judges 
have an “overwhelming incentive to clear their docket. They cannot reliably police the day-to-day 
interests of absent class members”). 
359. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). 
360. Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28 (1998) (MDL court 
cannot transfer a case to itself for trial.).  
361. See Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict 
Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1986 (2011) (“Remands are so uncommon, however, that 
MDLs have been compared to ‘black holes.’” (citing, among others, Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials, 
supra note 343, at 2330 n.21)). 
362. DUKE STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 298, at xii. 
363. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 15, at 274–81 (describing settlement).  
364. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.  
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As noted above, nothing requires MDL courts to front-load those 
considerations when appointing MDL common benefit counsel. So they 
instead select along other dimensions, including cooperativeness. By the 
time of any class action settlement, it is too late as a practical matter to 
use subclassing to assure adequate representation via the alignment of 
interests of subclass counsel and subgroups of class members because a 
settlement has already been negotiated by conflicted counsel. As one set 
of BP objectors noted: “[f]irst, there was Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee; 
then there were settlement negotiations; and only then did the PSC select 
class representatives to ratify a fait accompli.”365 That timeline naturally 
places downward pressure on the Rule 23 standards regarding adequacy 
of representation, and leads to an “anything but subclassing” mentality 
among trial court judges looking to preserve global settlements. If judges 
are confident they have helped to achieve a just class settlement that they 
view as their only viable endgame, and if a strict reading of Amchem 
disrupts that settlement, odds are that judges will read the strictness out 
of the decision. And so they have. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has yet to revisit Amchem and Ortiz. The Court is 
unlikely to waver from the basic principle they espoused, that adequate 
representation is the sine qua non of non-party preclusion. But late 
twentieth century sensibilities regarding the nature of class conflicts that 
might threaten adequate representation, regarding the role of conflicts 
management in assuring adequate representation, and regarding 
subclassing as the vehicle for achieving it, all now seem quaint and out 
of touch with current institutional arrangements. It’s high time to 
recognize the collapse of the class conflicts management regime 
announced in Amchem and Ortiz and to acknowledge the contours of the 
new regime emerging in its stead. 
 
                                                     
365. Memorandum in Support of Objections to the Economic and Property Damages Settlement 
Agreement by Objectors Hunter Armour and Judith Armour at 10, In re Oil Spill, No. 02:10-cv-
07777 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012), ECF No. 101. 
